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CRIMINAL INSANITY
ARVAL A. MORRIS*

Mental capacity becomes relevant to the criminal law as soon as
a peace officer apprehends a person who has committed an anti-social
act. Policemen, and later prosecutors, must decide whether the offender is "well" (sane), responsible for his acts, and the proper subject
of criminal proceedings or whether he is "sick" (insane), not responsible for his acts, and the proper subject of civil commitment or similar
process.1 These are threshhold questions in criminal law enforcement.
If criminal processes are used, then the trial stage presents twin questions: whether an accused is capable of standing trial,2 and whether he
was insane at the time he allegedly committed the act. After trial,
some jurisdictions such as Washington, 3 condition their appeals by the
question: is the defendant mentally able to aid counsel?4 If defendant
is unable to aid counsel on appeal, then his appeal is delayed until he
has recovered sufficient mental competence. In this day of courtassigned counsel, rather than pro se appearances, this rule seems to be
poorly advised because defendants actually play minimal roles in preparation and presentation of appeals,' and because delaying an appeal
creates a formidable obstacle in getting a reversal of unjustified convictions; furthermore, delay creates obvious injustices for wrongly convicted persons.' After appeal, the criminal corrections process is con7
ditioned by questions about a person's competency to be sentenced,
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
See A. GOLDSTIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 171-91 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
GOLDSTEIN]; Morris, Book Review, 43 WASH. L. REv. 623 (1968).

'For discussion of this requirement and of Washington's position, see Morris,
Book Review, supra note 1.
' State v. Jones, 57 Wn. 2d 701, 359 P.2d 311 (1961); see Annot., 49 A.L.R. 807
(1927).
' E.g., Williams v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 585, 124 S.W.2d 990 (Tex. Crim. App.
1938), and People v. Skwirsky, 213 N.Y. 151, 107 N.E. 47 (Ct. App. 1914). The
reason for the rule is the fear that if defendant cannot aid in the appeal then, if the
appeal proceeds, possible grounds relevant to a reversal will be lost forever, and the
integrity of the appellate procedure will be impaired.
'See Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954).
o See Note, Appellate Proceedings Stayed During Insanity of Accused, 56 COLUm.
L. REV. 133 (1956).

"The test of mental competency to be sentenced is very similar to the test of
competency to stand trial: Is the convicted-accused capable of aiding counsel on
any matters relevant to his sentence? See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DisO1ER As A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE, 431-33, 459 (1954) [hereinafter cited as WEIHOFEN]. Furthermore, it would have little, or no, deterrent value to sentence an insane convictedaccused while he was incapable of understanding the meaning of his sentence.
[ 583]
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and if competent, about his mental capacity to carry out his sentence,'
parole9 or to appreciate his execution.' °
This article will not deal with the different concepts of criminal insanity applicable at various stages in the criminal law process. Instead,
it will focus on one concept: the concept of insanity at the time of the
act, commenting on Washington materials wherever possible."
CONTEXT OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE

One of the fundamental premises underlying modern Anglo-Saxon
criminal law is that an individual must be responsible for his actions
before he is criminally liable.' If he is responsible, he is capable of
serving as an object of blame. Curiously, there has been little discussion in the literature of the criminal law on the criteria under which
the legal concept of "being responsible" is appropriately invoked.13
'In Washington, if an accused is found guilty, sentenced and then found insane,
the sentence can be suspended until the convicted-accused recovers his sanity;
whereupon, the sentence can be reinstated. See State v. Wilson, 69 Wash. 235, 124
P. 1125 (1912); State v. Schrader, 135 Wash. 650, 238 P. 617 (1925); and State
v. Davis, 6 Wn. 2d 696, 108 P.2d 641 (1940).
'See Comment, Influence of Mental Illness On Tie Parole Return Process,
59 MICH. L. REV. 1101 (1961).
1"See Grossi v. Long, 136 Wash. 133, 238 P. 983 (1925), where a jury found
defendant sane at time of the act; he was convicted of murder in the first degree,

and sentenced to be hanged. Prior to execution he was found insane, and execution
was stayed until sanity was restored, whereupon execution of defendant could then
take place.

Note, also, State v. Davis, 6 Wn. 2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641, 650 (1940),

and In re Lang, 77 N.J.L. 207, 71 A. 47 (Sup. Ct. 1908), and Annot., 49 A.L.R. 804
(1927). One court has put it quaintly, that "The plea at this stage is only an
appeal to the humanity of the court to postpone the punishment until a recovery
takes place or as a merciful dispensation." Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 200,
211 (1877), and see, WEIHOFEN at 459-70 (1954), and Hazard & Louisell, Death,
The State And The Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1962).
"See generally D. Niles, Insanity And Mental Illness In Criminal Cases In
Washington (1961), (unpublished article in University of Washington Law Library).
""The legal and moral traditions of the western world require that those who,
of their own free will and with evil intent (sometimes called mens rea), commit
acts which violate the law, shall be criminally responsible for those acts." Durham
v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY
I-NTO CRIMINAL GUILT 37 et. seq. (1963); H. M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958); Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of
M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 790-99 (1967); cf. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND THE ELIMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY (1962).
But compare the dissent of
LUKAS, A CRIMINOLOGIST LOOKS AT CRIMINAL GUILT, SOCIAL IEANING OF LEGAL

CONCEPT 113, 151-52 (E. Cahn ed. 1950).
"For beginning explorations see, e.g., Bibliography, Criminal Responsibility,
1 ISSUES IN CRIEMINOLOGY 158 (1967), and H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1964), PUNISIIMENT AND THE ELIMINATION OF REsPONSIBILITY
(1962), LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ExcusEs ix DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM (Hook
1961) ; Bazelon, The Concept of Responsibility, 53 GEO. L.J. 5 (1964) ; SCHLICK,
WHEIN IS A MAN RESPONSIBLE (1939); Hart, Prolegomenon to Principles of Punishment in 60 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y PROC. (1959); Hart, Ascription of Responsibility
and Rights in 49 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y PROC. 171-94 (1949); -Wasserstrom, H.L.A.

Hart and the Doctrines of Meus Rea and Criminal Responsibility. 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 92 (1968) ; see also G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME (1965) ;
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Surely, these are fundamental notions 4 which should be explored.
Without determining the criteria for legal blameworthiness, the law
has proceeded on the robust assumption that all persons are sane,
competent and responsible for their acts, unless evidence shows the
contrary."6 Proceeding in this way naturally focuses attention on the
concept of insanity at the expense of developing clear formulations
regarding legal responsibility and competency. Without clear ideas on
the latter, it is no wonder that current tests of the insanity defense
can be described as "vague and confused."' 6
Three states have tried to eliminate the defense. This course of
action is sometimes advocated by those who believe that the question
of legal insanity is solely a psychiatric question, and that it should be
answered by a panel of psychiatric experts.' These people usually
hold that the concept of blameworthiness is outmoded, and should
not be part of our criminal law. But each attempt at abolition has
proved to be a failure.
Washington's attempt is instructive. In 1909, Washington's legislature passed a statute declaring that insanity at the time of the act
was not a defense to a criminal charge. 9 A case then arose in which
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961); A. HARDING,
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALS (1960); BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRImINAL

GUILT (1963) ; Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, 33 PHILOSOPHY
325 (1958) ; Flew, The Justification of Punishment,29 PHILOSOPHY 291 (1954) ; Hall,
Psychiatric Criminology: Is It a Valid Marriage: The Legal View, 16 BUFFALO L.
REV. 349 (1967); H. MORRIS, FREEDOr AND RESPONSIBILITY (1961); Quinton, Olt
Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 1933-42 (1954); Wilson, Freedom and Compulsion in 67
MIND 60 (1958).
E.g., ~AL. PEN. CODE § 26 (West 1955) states that children, idiots, lunatics
and insane persons are not considered "persons ...capable of committing crimes";
but this does not go very far toward giving us an appreciation of the law's notion
of responsibility, because one must determine what constitutes insanity and then,
regarding all other persons, the usual presumptions of competency and responsibility
prevail. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE, art. II (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962). I have located no
comparable section in Washington.

"5See, e.g., State v. Mays, 65 Wn. 2d 58, 66-68, 395 P.2d 758, 764-5 (1964);

State v. Bonner, 53 Wn. 2d 575, 335 P.2d 462 (1959); State v. Hartley, 25 Wn. 2d 211,

170 P.2d 333 (1946).
" WEIHOFEx at 1 (1954).
" State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss.
142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910);
Cf. Davis v. Britt, -

Ark. -, 420 S.W.2d 863

(1967); see Dubin, Mens Rea

Reconsidered; A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18
STAN. L. REv. 322, 387 (1966). Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity DefenseWhy Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
'1See, e.g., B. Woo N, CRIME AND THE CRImINAL LAW (1963); P. ROCHE,
THE CRIMINAL MIND 273-74 (1958); McCORD & MCCORD, PSYCHOPATHY AND DELINQuENCY 186-87 (1956); MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
94 (1952).
"It shall be no defense to a person charged with the commission of a crime, that
at the time of its commission, he was unable by reason of his insanity, idiocy
or imbecility to comprehend the nature and quality of the act committed, or to
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a defendant was convicted of first degree assault. He had tried to
interpose an insanity defense, but it was not allowed by the trial court
because of the statute. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional, abridging article 1, section
21 of the State Constitution: "The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.""'" The court reasoned that mens rea and the insanity defense were deeply intrenched notions in the Anglo-Saxon heritage of
our criminal laws; that to be labeled "guilty" a man must first be
capable of forming a guilty intent; that this is a jury question; that
this was the state of affairs when Washington adopted its Constitution,
and that "[t]o take from the accused the opportunity to offer evidence
tending to prove this fact [insanity], is, in our opinion, as much
a violation of his constitutional right of trial by jury as to take from
him the right to offer evidence before the jury tending to show that
he did not physically commit the act or physically set in motion a
train of events resulting in the act."' 2 1 Mr. Justice Holmes has observed that "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked . .. 22 Therefore, "guilty but irresponsible" is an
impermissible contradiction in terms. Inherent in the concept of guilt
is the implication of responsibility, and a man has a constitutional
right to have his guilt or innocence determined by a jury of his peers.
Thus, Washington's experience is instructive on at least three points:
(1) that attempts to abolish the insanity defense will fail for constitutional reasons; (2) that a person's responsibility for a crime is for
jury determination, and (3) that since a panel of psychiatric experts
will not qualify as a jury of one's peers, psychiatric "treatment tribunals '12 3 would not be allowed to decide whether an accused was
24
insane at the time of the act.
understand that it was wrong; or that he was afflicted with a morbid propensity
to commit prohibited acts; nor shall any testimony or other proof thereof be
admitted in evidence.
Ch. 249, § 7, [1909] Sess. Laws of Wash. l1th Sess. 891.
'State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106 at 112, 119, 110 P. 1020 at 1021, 1024 (1910)
and due process of law, id. at 112, 123, 110 P. at 1021, 1025.
"Id., at 119, 110 P. at 1024 (1910). In short, there can be no crime without criminal
intent, i.e., mens rea. But compare State v. Lindberg 125 Wash. 51, 215 P. 41 ( 1923).
20. W. HOLMES, THE ComI-moN LAW 3 (1881).
'See B. WOOTTEN, CRI-ME AND THE CRIMIN'AL LAW (1963); B. WooTT ,
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1959); Kubie, Research in Judicial Administration: A Psychiatrist'sView, 39 B.U. L. REv. 157 (1959).
"Failing this, some jurisdictions set up a bifurcated trial. If an accused pleads
not guilty by reason of insanity, and also enters other pleas, California requires
that he first be tried on the other pleas, conclusively presuming an accused sane
during this "guilt" trial, then, if found guilty, the accused is tried separately on
the insanity defense, before the same or a different jury. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026

1968]

CRIMINAL INSANITY

It should be emphasized that the law's definition of "insanity" is
legal, not medical. Contrary to arguments advanced by medical critics,
the law does not seek to identify and excuse those persons who are
medically "insane," nor is there any reason that it should. The medical and legal conceptions of insanity are really quite different, and
different social policies underlie them.2 A psychiatrist's task is to
relieve, or cure, defects of the mind, and not to draw a sharp legal
line through various mental ailments separating the "insane" from
the rest. True, he may classify a patient as paranoid, schizophrenic,
manic-depressive, senile psychotic or paretic; however, he need not
draw a sharp line between sanity and insanity. But the law draws
such a line when it distinguishes between conviction and acquittal.2"
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE

A clearer comprehension of the problems inherent in the insanity
defense is facilitated by historical understanding. Early English law
did not allow the insanity defense. Furthermore, there seems to have
been no general requirement of a guilty mind.27 The Leges Henrici
(1100 to 1135) reveal that the general principle of criminal liability
(West 1956). But, as has been shown, this method fails in one important respect.
In the first trial, the "guilt" trial, mens rea is necessarily implicated, and, of
course, therefore, so is the mental ability of the accused. To determine a defendant's
guilt without admitting evidence of his mental state at the time of the crime would
be a denial of due process of law. See People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d
492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 836 (1949).
This bifurcation results in two trials over substantially the same material. For
excellent commentary, see Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated
Trial. 49 CALIF. L. REv. 805 (1961).
Z G. WLLIAms, CRImiNAL LAW 442-46 (2d ed. 1961).
Contrary to popular, and some professional psychiatric, beliefs, Freud recognized the value of the criminal law, and was neither against the concept of blameworthiness nor punishment: "There are innumerable civilized people who would
shrink from murder or incest, and who yet do not hesitate to gratify their avarice,
their aggressiveness and their sexual lusts, and who have no compunction in hurting
others by lying, fraud and calumny, so long as they remain unpunished for it; and
no doubt this has been so for many cultural epochs." S. FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN
ILLUSION 19-20 (Jones ed. 1928). Freud stoutly maintained that "culture must be
defended against the individual, and its organization, its institutions and its laws,
are all directed to this end. . .". Id. at 9-10; 19 S. FREUD, STANDARD EDITION OF
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WoRKs 208 (Strachey ed. 1961); and see H. HARTmAN,
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MORAL VALUES

15 (1960).

' It appears that the genesis of the doctrine of mens rea "is to be found in the
mutual influences and reactions of Christian theology and Anglo-Saxon law." Levitt,
The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REv. 117, 136 (1922); but see
Agretelis, "Mens Red" in Plato and Aristotle, 1 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 19 (1965),
where it is argued that the intellectual roots of the mens rea doctrine are properly
located in the moral philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Actually, it was first mentioned as a legal principle in the Code of Hammurabi (Circa 1790 B.C.). In this
code if a man killed another and swore it was unintentional, he was merely fined
according to the rank of the deceased.

[ VOL. 43 : 583
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did not require fault or a guilty mind (mens rea); ill intent, however,
was a necessary element in proving perjury.28 Mens rea appears to
have entered the criminal law via the crime of perjury.2 By the
thirteenth century proof of an intentional element was necessary to
convict for felony." We can trace the beginnings of the insanity
defense from this time.
Initially insanity was not a trial defense. The English Crown began
using total and complete insanity as the basis for granting pardons
to persons convicted of homicide. 1 A clear formulation of the initial
test of insanity is lost in history. It appears that madness was the
governing idea. Madmen were not looked upon as persons, but were
considered akin to beasts, or brutes, because they lacked reasoning
powers. These ideas gave rise to the infamous "wild brute" or "wild
32
beast" test of insanity.
By Edward I's reign (1272-1307) the concept of insanity penetrated
the trial process. Absolute and complete insanity functioned to mitigate punishment. 3 Finally, by the time of Edward III (1327-1377),
' Early criminal law developed out of the blood feud, and was grounded in the
desire for vengeance. Vengeance, of course, seeks a blameworthy victim. But, this
need not mean a victim possessing an evil design, i.e., a mens rea. There are
numerous passages in the law on the ancient books pointing to criminality in
certain cases without criminal intent. For discussion see 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50-54 (1927); Sayre, iIMens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974,
975-82 (1932).
'Sayre, supra note 28, at 983 n.30, perceptively points out that the introduction of
mens rea into the crime of perjury goes back to a sermon on oaths by St. Augustine
(James 5:12); see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
476 n.5 (1898).
' The earliest systematic attempt to describe criminal responsibility in English
criminal law was finished about 1256 by HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINiBUS ANGLIAE. It contains many passages showing the necessity of a guilty
mind for felony conviction. See Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 983-89
(1932).
a J. BIGGS, TIHE GUILTY MIND 83 (1955). This worthy book presents an historical picture of the growth of law and psychiatry in general, and in particular
the law of homicide and its development in connection with psychiatry. It is based
on Judge Biggs' lectures given as recipient of the Isaac Ray Award which is
presented annually by the American Psychiatric Association to one who "has made
a laudable contribution to the improvement of the relationship of law and psychiatry." I rely, in part, on Judge Biggs for the following historical sketch.
12Guttmacher attributes the "wild beast" test to Bracton. Guttmacher, A Historical Outline of the Criminal Law's Attitude To-ward .Mental Disorder, 4 ARCHIVES
OF CRUM. PSYCHODYNAymIs 668 (1961); as do S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND
THE CRI-MINAL LAW 126-27 (1925), and J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY 'MIND 82 (1955).
But as Platt makes clear in Platt, The Origins and Development of the "Wild
Beast" Concept of Mlfental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1965), Bracton's "wild beast" test was misinterpreted by English courts. Bracton used the Latin term "brutis" to mean brutes,
i.e., animals, who lack reason; he did not intend, or use it to associate the insane
with

wild

beasts

seized

with

diabolical

possessions,

and

hence,

originated

the

wild beast myth of insane persons.
'J. BIGGS, TIHE GUILTY 'MIND 83 (1955); see S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDERS
AND THE CRIIINAL LAW 125 (1925); Eliasberg, Urge and Motiation in Crininology, 43 J. CRI-m. L.C. & P.S. 319 (1952).
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if one could prove that he was completely "mad" then he successfully
could defend against a criminal charge. 4 By 1581, the relationship
between a guilty mind and criminal responsibility was well established,
and the lack of a guilty mind constituted grounds for denying criminal
responsibility. 3 But insanity, to qualify as a defense, had to be complete and continuing, not partial or temporary.
In 1736 Sir Matthew Hale's highly influential History of the Pleas
to the Crown was posthumously published. Following Coke, Lord Chief
Justice Hale distinguished between two independent forms of insanity:
partial and total. According to Hale "absolute madness," which he
believed to be a total deprivation of memory and reason, would function as a defense to a criminal charge because the person charged
could not be said to have had the required "animo Jelonico." For
him, such human beings were not "persons," but brutes.3" Hale also
stated that partial insanity equally could function as a defense to a
criminal charge, but "this is a matter of great difficulty." Probably
the defense of insanity at the time of the act was unavailable to any
accused who exhibited any sign of rationality at his trial.
This view appears to be verified by the instructions given in Arnold's
case which allowed only total and continuing insanity to function as a
defense. Under a delusion, and believing that he had been injured
by him, Edward Arnold shot Lord .Onslow. Mr. Justice Tracy in
summing up the "wild beast" test of insanity to the jury used language
strikingly similar to M"Waughton's test, and practically eliminated the
possibility of partial insanity:3 7
"'J. BIGGS, supra note 33 at 83.
'Id.
Judge Biggs quotes Lambard in his Eirenarcha (a handbook for justices
of the peace) as saying: "If a mad man or a natural foole, or a lunatike in the time
of his lunacie, or a child y apparently hath no knowledge of good nor uil do kil a
md, this is no felonious acte, nor anything forfeited by it... for they canot be said
to haue any understanding wil. But if up6 examinati5 it fal out, y they knew what
they did, & y it was ill, thE seemeth it be otherwise." Id. at 84. One should recall
that "lunacy" literally was believed to have been caused by the moon, i.e., moonmadness, and the locution "the time of his lunacy," probably refers to the phase of
the moon that was supposed to have affected the person. E.g., M. HALE, HISTORIA
PLACITORUM CORONAE 30 (1847). Judge Biggs believes that the above quoted paragraph from Lambard is the origin of the "knowledge of good and evil" test of insanity. Id. But see RoYAL Coaia-'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 397 (1953).
'This
may be a strand in the misinterpretation of Bracton's "wild beast" test
of insanity. Hale wrote: "...these dementes are both in the same rank; if they
are totally deprived of the use of reason, they cannot be guilty ordinarily of capital
offenses, for they have not the use of understanding, and act not as reasonable
creatures, but their actions are in the condition of brutes." M. HALE, HISTORIA
PLACITORUM CORONAE 31-2 (1847).
'The Trial of Edward Arnold, 16 State Trials 695, 764-65 (1723). Mr. Justice

Tracy added that ". . .punishment is intended for example, and to deter other persons
from wicked designs; but the punishment of a madman.., can have no example."

Id.
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If he was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between
good and evil, and did not know what he did, though he committed the
greatest offence, yet he could not be guilty of any offence against any law
whatsoever; ... a mad man... must be a man that is totally deprived of
his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no
more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the
object of punishment, ...
Evidence admitted at trial demonstrated that Arnold had been suffering from a severe mental illness, but, nevertheless, he was found guilty
and sentenced to death. What may have been decisive is that Arnold
showed signs of rationality; for example, he could write and had purchased a gun. Arnold, at the request of Lord Onslow, was "respited"
and spent 30 years in jail where he died.
The case of James Hadfield"8 in 1800 was a dramatic milestone for
the insanity defense. Hadfield, a soldier recognized for bravery and
once an orderly for the Duke of York, tried to assassinate King
George III in a box of the Theatre Royal and was indicted for high
treason. Hadfield had sustained head wounds during battle3 ' and was
subject to delusions. He believed that the world was coming to an
end; that he was a savior of man, and that like Jesus Christ, he,
Hadfield, must sacrifice himself as a martyr. Because he had no desire
to commit suicide, the best way to martyr himself was to assault the
King. At trial, Hadfield's counsel observed that Hadfield appeared
to have been "cut across all the nerves which give sensibility and
animation to the body."4
The prosecution showed that Hadfield
displayed many signs of rationality; e.g., he had cleverly concealed
his pistol and had purchased slugs and gunpowder for it. Thus, under
the views set forth by Sir Matthew Hale and Mr. Justice Tracy, the
prosecution contended that Hadfield was neither an idiot nor a madman, for Hadfield was not "afflicted by the absolute privation of
reason."" Hadfield's counsel anticipated modern developments in the
rules of insanity. He argued that a man could know right from wrong,
could understand the nature of the act that he was about to commit,
could manifest a clear design and foresight in planning and executing
that act; yet, if he had a defective mental condition that produced, or
' Hadfield's Case, 27 State Trials 1281 (1800).
' "The point of a sword was impelled against him with all the force of a man

urging
his horse in battle." Id. at 1320.
40 Id.
,1Id. at 1286.
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was the cause of the act, then he ought not be held criminally responsible for it.
Before completion of trial Lord Kenyon, the Chief Justice, suggested to the prosecution that the trial terminate because "if a man
is in a deranged state of mind at the time, he is not criminally answerable for his acts."42 The prosecution accepted the suggestion whereupon Lord Kenyon stated to the jury, ".... I believe it is necessary
for me to submit to you, whether you will not find that the prisoner,
at the time he committed the act, was not so under the guidance of
reason, as to be answerable for this act, enormous and atrocious as it
appeared to be."4*3 The jury found Hadfield not guilty, "he being
'44
under the influence of insanity at the time the act was committed.
Hadfield was continued in custody. Thus, the test of criminal insanity had taken a dramatic step away from the "wild beast" formulation that had been set forth in Arnold's case.
The decision in Hadfield's case is important for two reasons. It
clearly held that insanity at the time of the act would excuse. An
insane defendant need not be completely and continually deprived of
all indicia of rational functioning in order to avail himself of the
insanity defense. Yet, this conclusion must be tempered by the fact
that at trial Hadfield looked as though he were totally deranged; this
could not help but have influenced bench and jury. Secondly, the test
of insanity did not turn on whether defendant was a "wild beast" or
on whether defendant had the ability to distinguish right from wrong.
While remaining part of the test of insanity, the capacity to distinguish
good from evil was not the decisive consideration on the insanity issue.
Between 1812 and 1840, three major cases appeared which turned
the development of the insanity defense back towards the "wild beast"
test by requiring a total absence of conscious awareness at the time
of committing the act. In these cases defendants had been charged
with murder and had pleaded insanity. They all suffered from severe
mental disorders of varying degrees. One of the defendants was found
guilty and executed, and the other two were acquitted. 45 This, then,
was the general development of the major precedents up to 1843 when
"Id. at 1353.

Id. at 1355.
"Id. at 1356.
"Trial of John Bellingham, reported in 1 COLLINSON, IDIOTS, LUNATICS, AND
OTHER PERSONS NoN CoMn'os MENTIS 636 (1812); Rex v. Offord, 172 Eng. Rep.
924 (1831) ; Regina v. Oxford, 9 Carr. & P. 525, 545 et seq. (1840).
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the celebrated case of The Queen Against Daniel 31'Naughton" was

decided.
Daniel M'Naughton, a Scot wood-turner, who posthumously has
been described as "an extreme paranoic entangled in an elaborate
system of delusions,"47 assassinated Edward Drummond, secretary to
the Prime Minister, on the mistaken belief that Drummond was the
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel.4" Three judges sat at his trial,
accompanied for one day by Prince Albert, Queen Victoria's consort.
who probably sat with the court as her emissary.
The Queen had more than an ordinary interest in M'Naughton's
case and the insanity defense."' M'Naughton's assassination of Drummond on January 20, 1843, marked the fifth attack on the English
Crown or its officers since the turn of the century. Hadfield tried to
assassinate George III in 1800.5" In 1813 Bellingham killed the Chan-

cellor of the Exchequer." Oxford, in 1840, had shot at Queen Victoria
but escaped punishment through a successful plea of the insanity
defense." Twice in 1842 attempts were made on the life of Queen
Victoria,-once in the presence of Prince Albert by a crazed youth
named Francis who was convicted, but whose death sentence was
commuted to life imprisonment; and once by a youth named Bassett
"'The Queen Against Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials, N.S., 847 (1843). For
a radio dramatization of M'Naughton's original trial, see Glueck, lental Illness and
Criminal Responsibility. 2 J. Soc. THrRE.pvV 134 (1956); for an historical account, see
Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Riqht and l[rong" Test of Criminal Responsibiliti, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1227 (1966).

S. I7ECK, LAW AND PSYCIIATRY 44 (1964). Guttmacher and Weihofen say
that M'Naughton was "under the influence of a form of mental disorder symptomized by delusions of persecution, in which Peel appeared as one of the persecutors," see their

PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW

403 (1952).

W'\\hy did M'Naughton err, shooting Drummond instead of Peel? "M'Naughton
had come from Glasgow, and it was said that when the Queen was in Scotland, Sir
Robert Peel invariably rode in the royal carriage and Mr. Drummond in Sir
Robert's own carriage." CASSELL, PETTER & GALPIN, 7 CASSELS'S ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 580 (circa 1864). Thus, M'Naughton seems to have identified
Drummond as Peel. Judge Biggs reports that Peel wrote a letter to the Queen
stating that a police inspector had talked with M'Naughton the day after the shoot-

ing: "I suppose you are aware who is the person whom you have shot?" M'Naugh-

ton replied: "Yes-Sir Robert Peel." J. BIcGs, THE GUILTY MIND 98 (1955)
quoting 1 BENsoN, THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA, 1837-1861, at 571 (1907).
"The prisoner had no animosity against Sir Robert Peel, for whom lieis said to
have mistaken Mr. Drummond." The Queen v. Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials,
N.S., 847, 899 (1843).
'9The letters of Queen Victoria show that she and many members of the English
ruling class believed that the attempt to assassinate Peel may have been plotted by
the Anti-Corn Law League; the Corn Laws were held in disrepute generally; thus,
Queen Victoria had sovereign and personal interests in M'Naughton's trial. I
BENSON, THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA, 1837-1861, at 570, 577, 585-87 (1907).
Hadfield's Case, 27 State Trials 1281 (1800).
"'Trial of John Bellingham, reported in I COLLINSON, IDIOTS, LUNATICS, AND
OTHER PERSONS NoN Co-mPos ME;NTIS 636 (1812).
" Regina v. Oxford, 9 Carr. & P. 525, 545 et seq. (1840).
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who was seen to have pointed "a pistol at the Queen's carriage," and
3
was imprisoned for 18 months.5

At trial, during March 3 and 4, 1843, nine medical witnesses testified to the effect that M'Naughton was insane, and portions of Dr.
Isaac Ray's then recently published book on forensic psychiatry were
quoted to the court. The selections from Dr. Ray's book attacked
Lord Hale's test of criminal insanity and the English cases upon which
it was based. 5 The testimony was so convincing 55 that Chief Justice
Tindal came close to directing a verdict of insanity, saying to the
jury:

"...

I cannot help remarking, in common with my learned

brethren, that the whole of the medical evidence is on one side, and
that there is no part of it which leaves any doubt on the mind.""0 He
then instructed the jury on the test of insanity 7 and committed the
case to the jurors who found the defendant "not guilty, on the ground
of insanity."," Thereupon, M'Naughton was committed to Broadmoor,
a mental institution, where he later died.
The London newspapers, the House of Lords and Queen Victoria59
' For discussion, see J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 98-100 (1955).
USe, e.g., The Queen v. Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials, N.S., 847, 878-9,
882-91 (1843). Dr. Isaac Ray, in 1838, published his Medical Jurisprudence Of
Insanity, and established himself as the Father of American forensic psychiatry.
I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838).
'"We feel the evidence, especially that of the last two medical gentlemen who
have been examined, and who are strangers to both sides and only observers of the
case, to be very strong, and sufficient to induce my learned brother and myself to
stop the case." The Queen v. Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials, N.S., 847, 924
(1843).
Id. at 925.
Id.: [T] he point I shall have to submit to you is whether on the whole of the
evidence you have heard, you are satisfied that at the time the act was committed
... [the prisoner] had that competent use of his understanding as that he knew
that he was doing, by the very act itself, a wicked and a wrong thing. If he was
not sensible at the time he committed that act, that it was a violation of the law of
God or of man, undoubtedly he was not responsible for that act or liable to any
punishment whatever flowing from that act.... [IHf on balancing the evidence in
your minds you think the prisoner capable of distinguishing between right and
wrong, then he was a responsible agent and liable to all the penalties the law imposes. If not ... then you will probably not take upon yourselves to find the prisoner guilty. If that is your opinion, then you will acquit the prisoner.
Note that this instruction is not the famous M'Naughton test.
51Id. at 926.
" She wrote to Peel: The law may be perfect, but how is it that whenever a case
for its application arises, it proves to be of no avail? We have seen the trials of
Oxford and M'Naughton conducted by the ablest lawyers of the day ... and they
allow and advise the Jury to pronounce the verdict of Not Guilty on account of
Insanity,-whilst everybody is morally convinced that both malefactors were perfectly conscious and aware of what they did! ... Could not the legislature lay
down that rule... which Chief Justice Mansfield did in the case of Bellingham
[does defendant possess "a sufficient degree of understanding to distinguish good
from evil, right from wrong, and whether murder was a crime not only against
the law of God, but against the law of his country."]; and why could not the
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all hotly attacked the judges and the results of M'Naughton's trial.
Curative legislation was proposed, and both Houses debated the propriety of M'Naughton's disposition and whether it constituted a dangerous state of affairs."" In accordance with the legal practice of the
day, the House of Lords could "take the opinion of the judges"'" on
legal questions; this, in effect, meant that the judges could be called
before the House of Lords to account for their actions. On June 19,
1843, the House of Lords called the judges before that body for the
second time on the matter.' After all, certain murders had gone unpunished. This time the fifteen common law judges were asked to
respond to five questions.'
Their answers constitute the famous
iiI'Naughton Rules on the insanity defense.
Lord Chief Justice Tindal answered for all the judges, except for
Mr. Justice Maule who gave a separate opinion. Since Tindal's reply
has become the official statement of the "M'Naughton Rule," which
is "the sole formula used by the courts of thirty states (and of Great
Britain) to define insanity for the jury,""4 and which, in conjunction
with the misnamed "irresistible impulse" test, defines the criterion of
criminal insanity in 18 other states and most federal jurisdictions,'"
judges be bound to interpret the law in this and no other sense in their charges to
the Juries?
1 BENSON, THE LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA, 1837-1861, at 587 (1907).
' For discussion of the newspaper, and other, attacks, see J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY
MIND 102 (1955).
" See The Queen v. Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials, N.S., 847, 926 (1843).
'2 Id.
'Id.: June 19, 1843.-The judges again attended the House of Lords, when the
following questions were lut to them without argument:-'lst.-What is the law
respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in
respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, where, at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting
contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of
insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or
of producing some supposed public benefit? '2nd-What are the proper questions
to be submitted to the jury when a person, alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the
commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?
'3rd.-In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's
state of mind at the time when the act was committed?
'4th.-If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits an offence
in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?
'5th.-Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw
the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial,
and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of
the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his
opinion whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that he
was acting contrary to law, or whether he was labouring under any and what
delusion at the time?
"Sec GOLDSTEIN, at 45, and H. WEIHOFEN, ,MENTAL.DISORDER As A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 68-81 (1954).
' The cases are collected in the appendix to Moore, M'Naghten Is Dead-Or Is
It? 3 HOUSTON L. REV. 58 (1965).
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I reproduce it here in full, supplying emphasis. Tindal said: 66
The first question proposed by your Lordships is this. 'What is the law
respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for
instance, where at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the
accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of
with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury or of producing some supposed public benefit?'
In answer to which question, assuming that your Lordships' inquiries
are confined to those persons who labour under such partial delusions
only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of the opinion that,
notvithstanding the party accused did the act complained of with a view,
under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some
supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he
is nevertheless punishable, according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew, at the time of committing such crime, that he was
acting contrary to the law, by which expression we understand your
Lordships to nean the law of the land.
Your Lordships are pleased to inquire of us, secondly: 'What are
the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, where a person alleged
to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular
subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime (murder,
for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?' And, thirdly: 'In
what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's
state of mind at the time when the act was committed?' And as these
two questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together,
we have to submit our opinion to be, that the jury ought to be told in all
cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a
sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction;and that, to establish a defence on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the part , accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter
part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been,
whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the differences
between right and wrong; which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading
to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when
put generally, and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the
party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with
'The Queen v. Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials, N.S., 847, 930-32 (1843).
(emphasis added).
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he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knoWeledYe
of the accused, solly and earchtsiVely with reference to the law of the
land,.it might tend to confound the ju'ry. by inducing them to believe
?hich

that an actual knowledg.e of the lawe of the land 'Was essential in order to
lead to a couiziction: whereas the law is administered upon the principle
that every one nmst be taken conclusively to know it, without proof
that he does know it. If the accused -was conscious that the act -was one
-which he ought not to do. and if that act was at the same time contrary
to the lat' of the land, he is punishable, and the usual course, therefore.
has been. to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to knov that he was doing an act that
was wrong; and this course we think is correct, accompanied with such
observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular
case nay require.
The fourth question which your Lordships have proposed to us is
this : 'If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits
an offense in consequence thereof, is lie thereby excused?' To -which
question the answer must of course depend on the nature of the delsion: but, making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he
labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects
insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to
responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists
were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion lie supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life.
and he kills that man, as lie supposes, in self-defence, lie would be
exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had
inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him
in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishlment.
The question lastly proposed by your Lordships is: 'Can a medical
man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner
previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and
the examination of all the witnesses. be asked his opinion as to the state
of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of
doing the act that he was acting contrary to law. or whether he was
labouring under any and what delusion at the time?' In answer thereto.
we state to your Lordships, that we think the medical man, under the
circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in
the terms above stated, because each of those questions involves the
determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it is for the
jury to decide, and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of
science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But. where the
facts are admitted, or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form. though the same cannot be insisted
on as a matter of right.
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The judges could not have believed that they were establishing a
precedent when expressing their views. Their opinion was not rendered in relation to a specific case, reasoning to its issues and special
circumstances; there was no argument on the subject, and the political
considerations that colored the judge's actions were manifest. 6 At
best, theirs was only an advisory opinion on the five questions, and
"their answers are a hotchpotch of the law as laid down from the time
of Bracton."'65 Yet, all cases involving the insanity defense heard in
England today, and in 48 American states and most federal jurisdictions, turn, in large measure, on the principles set forth by the judges
when they were called to account for themselves by the House of
Lords.
One American state, New Hampshire, from the beginning, has rejected M'Naughton. This is probably attributable to the correspondence that took place between Dr. Isaac Ray and Judge Charles
Doe.69 In 1868, Judge Doe devised a jury charge on the insanity
defense that he delivered to a jury in a case involving a defendant who
had killed a man during a robbery. It was accepted by New Hamp'rAs Mr. Justice Maule said: I feel great difficulty in answering the questions put

by your Lordships on this occasion :-First, because they do not appear to arise
out of, and are not put with reference to, a particular case, or for a particular
purpose, which might explain or limit the generality of their terms, so that full
answers to them ought to be applicable to every possible state of facts not inconsistent with those assumed in the questions; this difficulty is the greater, from the
practical experience both of the Bar and the Court being confined to questions
arising out of the facts of particular cases: secondly, because I have heard no
argument at your Lordships' Bar or elsewhere on the subject of these questions,
the want of which I feel the more the greater is the number and extent of questions which might be raised in argument; and, thirdly, from a fear, of which I
cannot divest myself, that as these questions relate to matters of criminal law of
great importance and frequent occurrence, the answers to them by the judges may
embarrass the administration of justice when they are cited in criminal trials. For
these reasons I should have been glad if my learned brethren would have joined
me in praying your Lordships to excuse us from answering these questions, but as
I do not think they ought to induce me to ask that indulgence for myself individually, I shall proceed to give such answers as I can, after the very short time which
I have had to consider the questions, and under the difficulties I have mentioned,
fearing that my answers may be as little satisfactory to others as they are to
myself.
Id. at 927.
1sJ. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 107 (1955). In a later edition of his book Dr.
Isaac Ray commented adversely on M'Naughton's formulations. See I. RAY, A
TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 39 (4th ed. 1860). For
discussion of the legal origins and attendant confusions in Tindal's answers, see
S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 161-86 (1925).

'See Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration In The
Jurisprudence Of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183 (1953), and Overholser, Psychiatry's Contributions To Crinbnal Law And Procedure, 12 OILA. L. REv. 13, 16
(1959). For discussion of early insanity tests, see N. DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY
IN

THE UNITED STATES,

1789-1865 (1964).
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shire's appellate court."0 In a later case7 the New Hampshire court
unanimously reaffirmed Judge Doe's views, holding that when the
insanity defense is in issue, "the real ultimate question to be determined seems to be, whether, at the time of the act, he had the mental
capacity to entertain a criminal intent-whether, in point of fact, he
did entertain such intent."7 2 The trial court judge had charged the
jury that: "If the killing was the offspring or product of mental
disease," the defendant should be acquitted.73 A major difference
between M'Naughton and the New Hampshire position, which laid
4
the basis for the Durham7
view, is that under New Hampshire's view
"all symptoms and all tests of mental disease were purely matters of
fact to be determined by the jury. ' 75 There is no legal rule defining
the criteria of criminal insanity.7 6 It was believed that further instructions on the issue would usurp the jury's authority.
Although unclear from the appellate opinion, New Hampshire's
position might have been the basis of an instruction on the test of
insanity given by a Washington trial court judge in 1906." On appeal,
counsel urged that the New Hampshire rule be allowed, but the
Washington State Supreme Court announced: "We cannot subscribe
to this test." ' The Washington court reasoned that New Hampshire's
rule "could have no possible application in this state" because under
it "the testimony of nonexpert witnesses will not be received to show
insanity"; whereas, in "this state the testimony of nonexpert witnesses
State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). Chief Justice Perley instructed the New
Hampshire jurors along the following lines:
If... [the jury] found that the defendant killed Brown in a manner that would be
criminal and unlawful if the defendant were sane-the verdict should be "not
guilty by reason of insanity" if the killing was the offspring or product of mental
disease in the defendant; that neither delusion nor knowledge of right and wrong,
nor design or cunning in planning and executing the killing and escaping or
avoiding detection, nor ability to recognize acquaintances, or to labor or transact
business or manage affairs, is, as a matter of law, a test of mental disease; but
that all symptoms and all tests of mental disease are purely matters of fact to be
determined by the jury.
Id. at 402. This basic viewpoint was first articulated by Judge Doe in 1866 in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120 (1866), but that case turned on a question of testamentary capacity, not criminal responsibility.
" State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 369.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
"State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
d'See Reid, Understanding The New Hampshire Doctrine Of Criminal Responsibility, 69 YALE L.J. 367 (1960).
7 State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909).
,'8 d. at 70, 100 P. at 168-69. It has also been rejected in Eckert v. State, 114
Wis. 160, 89 N.W. 826 (1902) and in People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 P. 329
(1897).
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is competent to show insanity.17 9 Others have criticized New Hampshire's position on the ground that it, like Durham, lays down no
legal rule of criminal responsibility and that one is necessary 0

AN ANALYSIS oF M'Naughton
Given the widespread influence of M'Naughton, several of its features should be described and analyzed. The test has two differing
branches, both stemming from the concept of knowledge. If an accused has defective reason, because of a disease of the mind, he is
excused from criminal responsibility if his condition precluded him
from knowing (1) "the nature and quality of the act he was doing,"
or from knowing (2) that "he was doing what was wrong." Thus, an
accused is entitled to the defense if he can satisfy either of the above
two conditions.
The objects of knowledge are different in the two divisions of
M'Naughton's test. One branch of the test is satisfied by a description; the other requires an evaluation. In one branch what counts is
knowledge of the act and its usual consequences. The question is
whether an accused had sufficient ability to appreciate the nature and
quality of his action. If an accused is able to give an accurate and
coherent factual description of his act and its usual attendant consequences, placing them in context, then presumably he is in contact
with reality and can appreciate the nature and quality of his act. As
Professor Hall says, the requirement that one know the nature and
quality of one's act "is the ordinary way of specifying what, in part
at least, is meant by the psychiatrist's 'reality principle' [that is] it
concerns knowledge of ordinary actions and their everyday consequences.""'
' Id. at 71, 100 P. at 169. Reaflirined in State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d 740, 314 P.2d
660 (1957). The instruction also carried a charge on the misnamed "irresistible
impulse" rule, and Washington's court held by a weird bit of reasoning, that
where such a charge was given in a state that followed M'Naughton's rule, it constituted reversible error, on the ground that where jurors are asked to answer more
than M'Naughton's questions, "they are invited to enter the realm of speculation
where even the opinion of alienists is met by like opinion."
[T]he fact that the criterion of responsibility cannot be defined with scientific
precision is not a sufficient reason for not defining it at all ....
The advantage of a
formula is that it serves to limit the arbitrary element and to promote uniformity,
as well as to help the jury to decide between conflicting views.... To have no rule
at all would be to leave the decision on which often a man's life depends to the
uncertain variations of ethical standard and emotional reaction which may influence the minds of members of a jury.

Hancock, Macdonald & Radzinowicz, Memorandum of Dissent, in ROYAL
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT,

285, 287 (1953).
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The second branch of M'Naughton adds another dimension to the
required object of an accused's knowledge. The second branch assumes that an accused knew the nature and quality of his act, and
asks whether he had the capacity to appreciate that his act was wrong.
Thus, in its second branch, the M'Naughton formula asks whether an
accused is able to evaluate his action as being either right or wrong.
This is plainly different from the first part of M'Naughton which calls
upon the accused only to give a true, contexual description of his act
and its usual consequences. The second part of M'Naughton is satisfied only by an evaluative statement, not by a contextually descriptive
one.
Some courts have denied that a distinction exists between the two
different branches of j1I'Naughton," 2 and Weihofen has identified five
courts that are of the opinion that the two different branches of
1I'Naughton are synonymousY The reason given for disregarding the
difference is "that if the accused did not know the nature and quality of
his act, he would have been incapable of knowing it was wrong." 4
This reasoning assumes that an accused must know the nature and
quality of his act before he can know whether his act was wrong. Thus,
there is a necessary, logical connection between VI'Naughton's two
branches. I agree. The two conditions of M1I'Naughton do not stand
on equal, independent logical grounds; one presupposes the other.
For illustration, turn the conditions around and ask whether an accused can know whether his act is wrong if he has no knowledge of
the act in question. This is a logical and factual impossibility.
This does not mean, however, that MV'Naughton is satisfied by
showing that the accused knew that he was wrong. For guilt to
attach it must also be shown that the accused knew the nature and
quality of his act. The prosecutor must establish both conditionsthat the accused knew the nature and quality of his act and that he
knew the act was wrong-before the accused can become a target for
criminal sanction. An accused is entitled to the insanity defense if
he can come under either of M'Naughton's two branches; he has two
"1J.HALL,

STUDIES IN JURISPRUDEI-CE AND CRI-MINAL THEORY 281 (1958).
'2"[K]nowledge of the wrongfulness of an act also embraces capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the same..." Maas v. Terr., 10 Okla. 714, 63 P.
960 (1901), and "it is almost inconceivable that a man could be sane enough to
appreciate and know the nature and quality of an act, and yet not know whether it
was right or wrong to commit such an act." Montgomery v. State, 68 Tex. Crim.
78, 151 S.W. 813 (1912) ; see WEIHOFEmN at 73.

s Id.
s GOLDSTEIN at

50.
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exculpatory strings to his bow. Surely it is error, therefore, to treat
the different branches synonymously and to give instructions relating
to only one branch.
The Nebraska court uniquely interprets M'Naughton in the conjunctive. Recognizing differences in M'Naughton's two branches, the
court requires an accused to satisfy both branches before qualifying
for the insanity defense." Such a conjunctive treatment of M'Naughton is reversible error in New York,"" as well it should be. A conjunctive reading drastically narrows the rule's application, not allowing it to apply to certain obvious cases of insanity. A man might know
the nature and quality of his act, but not know it is wrong. Conversely, a man might say that he knew his act was wrong, but he
may not have appreciated its nature and quality when he did it. Under
a conjunctive reading of M'Naughton he would fail to qualify for the
insanity defense. For example, in one case defendant knew the nature
and quality of his act when he chloroformed his 16-year-old son, a
congenital imbecile, paralyzed and able only to mumble. But defendant believed his act to be "right" for he believed that his act was
commanded by the "will of God."8s7 In another case defendant knew
the nature and quality of his act, but believed "that he had heard the
voice of God calling upon him to kill the victim as a sacrifice and
atonement.""8 Then, of course, there is Hadfield's case which did not
turn on Hadfield's ability to distinguish right from wrong. The point
is that M'Naugkton is to be read in the disjunctive, not in the conjunctive. 89
In 1957 the Washington Supreme Court eliminated jury instructions on one of M'Naughton's two disjunctive parts. A trial court
judge ruled out of the jury instructions all requested references to tie
phrase "the nature and quality of the act," and this was upheld
by the supreme court which said that the only required instruction
in Washington was that "a defendant, to establish a defense of
mental irresponsibility, must prove that he did not have the mental
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the
SId. at 75. Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 (1922).
People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d 581 (1936).
'People v. Greenfield, Bronx County Ct. (1939) ; see 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. 228 (1937).
' People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
' Wisconsin's court has held that an "important emphasis" is added to M'Naughton's test of insanity by the requirement that an accused know the nature and quality
of his act because this standard highlights the distinction between an accused's
"vaguely... [realizing] that particular conduct is forbidden" and "real insight into
the conduct." State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505, 521 (1962).
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act complained of.""0 The court held that in order to qualify as
criminally insane in Washington there was no requirement that defendant prove that he did not have the mental capacity to know the
nature and quality of his act, as he "might well have [to do] under
the M'Naughton rule."'" Thus, the Washington court did not follow
M'Naughton.
Furthermore, instead of reading M'Naughton accurately as setting
up two disjunctive propositions, the Washington court evidently
thought that the M'Naughton test (not applied by the court in
Collins) was properly read in the conjunctive. The court wrongly
believed that in order for an accused to qualify under M'Naughton,
he would have to prove that he came under both divisions of the rule.
This is the only reading of the opinion that accounts for the stated
justification in State v. Collins that the "instructions given, in so far
as they did not accurately state the M'Naughton rule [denying defendant instructions on knowledge of the nature and quality of his
act], were favorable and not prejudicial to the defendant, in that they
omitted one of the elements that the defendant could have been required to prove in order to establish his defense of mental irresponsi92
bility.)
The test the court substituted for the misinterpreted M'Naughton
test allowed only the right-wrong exculpatory branch. But as pointed
out above,"2 it does not make sense to ask if a man knew his act was
wrong without first ascertaining if he knew the nature and quality of
his act. Given the right-wrong test of insanity set forth in State v.
Collins, one must conclude that, if strictly adhered to, it is logically
and factually contradictory because it requires an accused to say
whether he knew the act he did was either right or wrong, without
allowing him to show that he did not appreciate his act. As a result
the test does not address itself to the very act for which the person
is being tried.
The test of criminal insanity in Washington is left in considerable
'State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d 740, 750, 314 P.2d 660, 666 (1957); the Washington court also approved this notion: "[H]is mind was diseased to such an extent
that he did not have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong with
respect to the act charged." See also State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963); State v. Putzell, 40 Wn. 2d 174, 242 P.2d
180 (1952); State v. Rio, 38 Wn. 2d 446, 230 P.2d 308, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 867
(1951); State v. Henke, 196 Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938); State v. Carpenter,
166 Wash. 478, 7 P.2d 573 (1932); State v. Long, 163 Wash. 607, 1 P.2d 844 (1931).
"' State v. Collins, supra note 90, at 751, 314 P.2d at 666.
92Id.
'See accompanying note 84, supra.
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doubt. The Washington court in State v. Collins clearly indicated that
M'Naughton was not the test of criminal insanity. In so doing it
clearly misconceived the M'Naughton test. Because of this misconception it believed its own right-wrong test was more liberal than M'Naughton, when, in fact, it was more restrictive because it eliminated
M'Naughton's "nature and quality" branch. 4 To add to the overall
confusion resulting from Collins, five years later the Washington court
said that "M'Naughton is, for good reason, the established rule in the
State of Washington." 5 In support of this statement the court cited
and simultaneously reaffirmed Collins. Is M'Naughton the test? If so,
is it M'Naughton in the disjunctive or in the conjunctive? Or does the
court still follow its own partial M'Naughton "right-wrong" test? The
answers to these questions must await future adjudication.
The next point to consider concerns the meaning of the word
"wrong" in the M'Naughton test. The test, in part, asks whether the
accused knew the act was wrong. Courts have been asked to decide
whether "wrong" means "legally" wrong or "morally" wrong. The
English courts have held that the word relates to legal wrong. 6 Few
American courts have considered this issue, but five who have confronted it have sided with the English courts.97 The American Law Institute believes that the standard is "legally" wrong. The Washington
court, contrary to prevailing opinion, has held that the standard is
"morally" wrong. In State v. Davis,99 the supreme court approved
a jury instruction requiring that an accused must be "unable to
perceive the moral qualities of the act with which he is charged."'
' It is important that this branch of M'Naughton be distinct and kept in jury
instructions. It covers at least two important situations: (1) insane automatism,
see, e.g., Regina V. Charlson [1955] 1 All E. R. 859, and R. V. Kemp [1956] 1 Q.B.
399, 40 Crim. App. 121, and (2) mistake or simple ignorance of fact. For discussion,
see N. MoRIs & C. HOWARD, STUDIES ix CRIMINAL LAW 37-78 (1964). G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW 477-90 (2d ed. 1961).
-:State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 593, 374 P.2d 942, 967 (1962), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 883 (1963). That the Washington court is confused is clear. In State v.
Collins, supra note 90 and text accompanying, the court clearly believed its test was
different from that of M'Naughton, but in State v. White, supra at 586, 374 P.2d
at 963, the court says: "The test is M'Naughton," citing State v. Collins! Earlier,
the court said Washington's test was "based on the M'Naughten [sic] rule."

R. V. Windle, [1952] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1, 2. See also G.

WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW

492 (2d ed. 1961). Suppose X kills Y knowing it is morally wrong, but is laboring under an insane delusion that his act is legally right. Would X have a defense of insanity?
'People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 416 (1959); State v. Foster, 44 Hawaii
403, 354 P.2d 960 (1960); State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1961);
McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S.W. 883 (1922); Harrison v. State, 44
Tex. Crim. 164, 69 S.W. 500.
'See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
'6Wn. 2d 696, 108 P.2d 641 (1940).
"Id. at 708, 108 P.2d at 647. "The instruction placed no undue burden upon
appellant and could not have confused the jury."
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The M'Naughton opinion is unclear on this issue. In one place
Lord Tindal says that an accused is punishable "if he knew at the
time of committing such a crime that he was acting contrary to law;
by which expression we... mean the law of the land."'01 But later
he says "if the accused was conscious that the act was one which he
ought to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law
of the land, he is punishable." On the basis of the opinion itself it
would seem that knowledge that the act was either legally wrong or
morally wrong would preclude an accused from qualifying for the
insanity defense under this branch of M'Naughton. Perhaps the
courts which have restricted the meaning of "wrong," to either wrong
in the legal sense or wrong in the moral sense have misinterpreted the
original M'Naughton opinion.
As a practical matter the way in which a court interprets the word
"wrong" may have little effect on the eventual outcome of a case.
When the accused is asked if he knew that the act he did was wrong
in the moral sense, the reference is probably to society's views on
morality, not the defendant's subjective morals. Because the insanity
defense is usually pleaded only when fundamental crimes are involved
and because fundamental crimes are both legally and morally wrong
(according to society's morals), the "legal" test and the "moral" test
are almost identical in actual operation.Y2
Two remaining phrases of the ilJ'Naughton test must be discussed:
"disease of the mind" and "know." Courts have not precisely
defined the phrase "disease of the mind," 1"' but this locution presents
The Queen v. Daniel M'Naughton, 4 State Trials, N.S., 847, 930 (1843).
Professor Goldstein perceptively points out that the only reason for urging
the moral interpretation of "wrong" is that "some writers see it as a way to broaden
an otherwise narrow definition of 'know.' The apparent hope is to bring to the
jury's attention the moral, and emotional, perpsective of the defendant." GOLDSTEIN
at 53. See also Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and
Wrong, 14 MIAM.MI L. REv. 30, 49 (1959). But there is no assurance that the confusion created by this test-i.e., whose morals should be used?-will work in favor
of the defendant. The jury is given the "morally wrong" instruction without comment as a general rule.
'm See GOLDSTEIN at 47-49. Professor Goldstein points out that little judicial
comment we have was written in relation to cases in which defendant's mental
condition was marginal, such as pleading insanity by intoxication, narcotics, etc.
In Washington, mental derangement resulting from self-induced, excessive use of
liquor or drugs, even amounting to a toxic psychosis, does not qualify as a disease of
the mind satisfying Washington's insanity defense. See Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wash.
Dec. 2d 778, 435 P.2d 692 (1968); State v. Rio, 38 Wn. 2d 446, 230 P.2d 308, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951) ; State v. Miller, 177 Wash. 442, 32 P.2d 535 (1934);
State v. Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 P. 258 (1900). This is consistent with other
jurisdictions. Mental retardation or "defect" can qualify as a mental disease;
however, the effect must be to deprive a defendant of M'Naughton's required
"knowledge." Bryant v. State, 115 A.2d 502 (Md. 1955). But in Georgia it was not
sufficient that defendant "had the mentality of a child nine or ten years old." Reece
10-
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many questions. °4 The phrase is not equivalent to medical classifications of mental diseases, whether one considers organic brain diseases,
such as paresis or congenital defects, psycho-functional diseases such
as the psychoses, psychoneuroses, psychopathy, or the less severe
personality disorders. 10 5 It appears that the legal phrase takes its
meaning from the rest of the M'Naugkton rule, and is, therefore,
severely limited by the meaning of the word "know," which is the
most important concept. Noncognitive mental disorders are, therefore, not "diseases of the mind." Only few of the psychoses and the
most severe forms of other mental disorders impair cognition, and thus
come within the phrase "disease of the mind."'0 6 Thus, whatever be
the disease that affects an accused's reason, to qualify as a "disease
of the mind" under M'Naughton, it must affect an accused's reason
so severely that he was deprived of knowledge of the nature and
quality of his act, or that he did not know what he was doing was
07
wrong.1
The most important concept in M'Naughton is the word "know."
This concept is critical because it circumscribes the entire test by
singling out one aspect of a human being's total personality, the
cognitive. Thus, the test is heavily intellectualistic, and from a
psychological point of view, narrow because the cognitive becomes
the single, important criterion of criminal responsibility.
Its narrowness is further compounded because the criterion of
knowledge has been restrictively interpreted. Indeed, Utah's Supreme
Court goes so far as to require that before a defendant can qualify
under M'Naughton he must be suffering from a disease of the mind
"'to such an extent that he did not know the nature of the act; that
is, did not know he had a revolver, that it may be loaded, or that, if
v. State, 212 Ga. 609, 94 S.E.2d 723 (1956). See also the writing of a psychiatrist:
C. JEFFERY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL DISEASE 193-226 (1967).
...
For some of the problems see P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 15, 253 (1958);
3. WOOTTEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 205-25 (1959); Diamond,
From M'Naughton to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. Rxv. 189, 192-93 (1962);
Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naughton, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1967);
Swartz, "Mental Disease," 111 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 390 (1963).
" For discussion, see WEIHOFEN at 10-49, 174-211, and 1 H. MANNHEIM, CoMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 242-82 (1965).
"The phrase is usually used clumsily to express a core meaning, "with regard
to such conditions in which the sense of reality is crudely impaired, and inaccessible to the corrective influence of experience-for example, when people are con-

fused or disoriented or suffer from hallucinations or delusions." Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Crininal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 378, 384
(1952). See also Kuh, The Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 771 (1962);
Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1960).
' See note 177 infra.
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discharged, it may injure or kill.' '""" The result of such a restrictive
interpretation is that it holds responsible many defendants who are
seriously disturbed, because it virtually precludes a successful assertion of the insanity defense. Since only few psychotics can actually
meet a highly restrictive interpretation of "know," the related concept of "diseases of the mind" is also restricted to those diseases
producing a total impairment of cognitive processes, i.e., some of the
psychoses.
Washington, too, indicates that it prefers a severe and restrictive
interpretation of its insanity defense. In its last full consideration of
the subject, the Washington Supreme Court held "that the established
policy in this state is to strictly limit the application of that [insanity]
" Furthermore, the court held that "considerations of stare
defense..'1..
decisis reinforce this argument,"" 0 and, stunningly, that "the defense
is available only to those persons who have lost contact with reality
so completely that they are beyond any of the influences of the
criminal law.""' The severity of the court's interpretation gives
credence to Zilboorg's wry observation that M'Naughton's standard
can be met only by "totally deteriorated, drooling, hopeless psychotics
1 2
of long standing, and congenital idiots."
Psychiatrists," 3 and others," 4 object to narrow interpretations of
"rState v. Kirham, 7 Utah 2d. 108, 319 P.2d 859, 860 (1958). Cases similarly
interpreting M'Naughton's knowledge requirement are collected in GOLDSTEI,,- at
235-36, n. 12.
"State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 590, 374 P.2d 942, 965 (1962), cert. denied,
375 0U.S. 883 (1963).
" Id.
Id. But cf. State v. Putzell, 40 Wn. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952). This requirement, citing State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957), seems to necessitate that defendant not know the nature and quality of his act ("lost contact with
reality") which, of course, contradicts what the Washington court held in State v.
Collins.
:12 G. ZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 273 (1943).

"The major objection raised by psychiatrists is that the test fails to recognize
that a mentally sick person might commit a crime because of morbid impulses
or morbid reasoning, even though, in a sense, he might know it was wrong
to do so. To illustrate this, two examples are generally given. One is the
instance of an idiot who cuts off his sleeping brother's head just to see how
annoyed the brother will be when he wakes up and can't find his head. The
other example is that of the paranoiac who, believing that a bystander is calling
him names, kills the bystander. It is argued that both these defendants would
have to be found guilty under the McNaughton test. The idiot, it is presumed, knew that it was wrong to cut off heads ... he must have been told, and
therefore he knew that it was, at least, naughty. And the paranoiac knows
that murder is not an appropriate retaliation for slander. Therefore both defendants knew their acts were wrong; hence, both are guilty. The point is
made that a formula which leads to so obvious a miscarriage of justice is all
wrong.
Davidson, Criminal Responsibility: The Quest for a Formula, in M. GUTTIMACHER
& H. WEIHOFEN,

PSYCHIATRY

AND THE LAW 61-62

(Hoch

& Zubin eds. 1955).
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the knowledge requirement. The psychiatric objections generally attack the verbal, or intellectualistic, interpretations of "know," saying
that the law's interpretation of "know" does not take account of
known facts about the human psychic apparatus. Psychiatrists hold
that there are at least two types of knowledge, and that there is a
"fundamental difference between verbal or purely intellectual knowledge and the mysterious other kind of knowledge [which] is familiar
to every clinical psychiatrist; it is the difference between knowledge
divorced from affect [emotional appreciation] and knowledge so fused
with affect that it becomes a human reality,"11 and further, "that
understanding is not a purely intellectual process and that the word
'know' as it is used in the phrasing of the criminal law dealing with
insanity is now used by psychiatrists in a sense totally different [in
the "affect" sense].... How can we have one conception of knowledge
when examining our patients and another as soon as we are sworn in
at the witness stand?"" 0 A psychiatrist is advised that he will be "on
much more solid ground.., if he carries with him his strict clinical
standard directly to the witness stand.""' Thus, the issue is joined,
usually at the witness stand during cross-examination, between the
psychiatrists' meaning of the concept of knowledge (including "affect," emotional appreciation) and a restrictive and intellectualistic
interpretation (excluding "affect"). 118
Guttmacher and Weihofen cite a poll of American psychiatrists showing that 80%
believed M'Naughton too narrow and unsatisfactory on this point, and they quote a
survey showing that 90% of Canadian psychiatrists were dissatisfied with the rule
there, M. GuTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 408 (1952).
"'E.q., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 872-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954); J.
BIGs, THE GUILTY MIND 132-33 (1955); H. WEiHOFE-, THE URGE TO PUNISH 11
(1957); Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 331 (1955).
SZilboorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, 9 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 540,
552-53 (1939). Zilboorg does not blame the law, but holds that "the incongruity is
caused by lack of clarity as to standards within the medical profession itself."
11Id. at 553.
The extreme cases of such divorcement between purely intellectual or verbal
perception and full realistic perception presents a clear-cut schizophrenic picture. But, not only the fully developed schizophrenic is afflicted with such a
split between word-concept and fact. We know that compulsion neurotics, or
obsessional neurotics, manifest the same clinical phenomenon, which in these
cases is called isolation ....
[T]he obsessional thought or the compulsive act is
isolated, effectively from the rest of the personality and becomes non-integrated
knowledge, or no knowledge at all.
Id. at 552.
11 Id. at 553.
"'The lack of agreement on meaning of key terms, the partisan quality of
expert witnesses, plus vigorous examination and cross-examination upsets many
psychiatrists so much that they (wrongly) refuse to enter the courtroom. "[Mi]ore
than 10 per cent of psychiatrists refuse all courtroom employment and.., another
20 per cent refuse employment as partisan experts ... that still leaves 70 per cent
of the nation's psychiatrists [but] the truth of the matter is that in this dissenting
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Most courts that have considered the question of "knowledge" in
M'Naughton interpret it more broadly than does Washington's
court.'19 California's Supreme Court has observed that "our trial
courts place a commendably broad interpretation upon the M'Naughton 'knowledge' test."' 2 ° The broader interpretation is followed in
Canada, Scotland, and possibly, Australia.' 2 '
It is important that the word "know" be interpreted broadly, i.e.,
to ask whether an accused had sufficient mental grasp of a total
situation to appreciate the full consequences of his act. A broad interpretation of "know" allows for a full development of psychiatric
testimony at trial. A decision on an accused's criminal responsibility
should be based on as much factual information as possible. A narrow
interpretation of the "knowledge" requirement, like Washington's,
could be used to restrict the presentation of evidence and keep from
the jury full psychiatric testimony depicting the true picture of an
accused's mental condition. 22 The principal function of a psychiatrist who testifies about an accused's state of mind is to inform the
jury, in simple English, of the character and implications of the accused's mental disease. The psychiatrist can do this only if he is
allowed some latitude, permitting him to explain directly to the jury,
translating the terms of his own discipline and experience into layman's language. The psychiatrist should detail carefully the nature
third are to be found most of the leaders of American psychiatry." M. GUTTMACHER,
THE MIXD OF THE MURDERER 119-20 (1960).
"By our system of partisan expert
witnesses we have alienated and deprived ourselves of the services of the best; and
accepted, and at the same time criticized and have been shocked by the performances of the worst." Niles, Impartial Medical Testimony, 45 ILL. BAR. J. 282,
283 (1957). But see J. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMUIAS OF CRIME 205-28
(1967). "A trial is not a scientific investigation; it is not a search for objective
truth. The doctor who undertakes to go to court and testify as an expert witness
must bear in mind that he is stepping squarely into the middle of a fight." M.
GUTTMACHER & H.
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 205 (1952).
For a
description toward movements toward impartial medical testimony in personal
injury cases, see H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCKHOLTZ, DELAY IN THE
COURT 120-28 (1959).
"' GOLDSTEIN at 49-50: "In eleven states, the jury is told that an accused 'knows'
only if he 'understands' enough to enable him to judge of 'the nature, character and
consequence of the act charged against him,' or if he has the 'capacity to appreciate
the character of and to comprehend the probable or possible consequences of his
act.'"
" People v. Wolff, 40 Cal. Rptr, 271, 394 P.2d 959, 962 (1964).
12 GOLDSTEINr at 237, n.14.
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1966); Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1954); S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 61-68 (1962); Roche, Criminal Responsibility in P. HOCH & J. ZUBIN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 112 (1955); Carroll & Leopold, 77e Current Influence
of Psychiatric Concepts in Determining Criminal Responsibility in Pennsylvania.
31 TEMP. L.Q. 254, 264, 280 (1958); Waedler, Psychiatry and the Problem of
Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 380-81 (1952).
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of the accused's disorder, the medical history of the accused, the
medical basis for the psychiatrist's diagnosis, and the probable consequences of the disease on the conduct of the accused.12 3 A broad
interpretation of the knowledge requirement is necessary to insure
the possibility that this type of testimony is brought to the jury so
the jury can be well informed.' 24
To insure a broad interpretation and to achieve the above mentioned result, the word "know" ought be dispensed with and the word
"appreciate" substituted. New York has done this.12' This substitution of words will allow for full development of the relevant expert
testimony, and will help the jurors understand and use psychiatric
testimony; in part, it will preclude them from voting their probable
preconceptions associated with a narrowly conceived, cognitive interpretation of "know." If necessary, and it may be, the judge should
instruct the jury that the term "appreciate" refers to, and includes,
emotional ("affect") as well as cognitive defects of human functioning.
M'Naughton AND A CONTROL TEST
Even if the word "appreciate" were substituted for "know," and
were accompanied by an appropriate jury instruction, it is highly
unlikely that the M'Naughton test would ever communicate adequately the conception that an accused should be acquitted by reason
of insanity if he lacks the ability, from a disease of the mind, to conform his actions to the requirements of law. M'Naughton's test was
devised in 1843 and drew on the prior law which, in turn, was formulated well before the advance of modern knowledge about human
psychic apparatus. M'Naughton fails to take sufficient account of
psychic realities and modern scientific knowledge. Psychiatry holds
that a man is a complex, integrated personality; 2G that reason is
only one element in a man's total psychic makeup; and that it is not
" Brief for Abram Chayes as amicus curiae at 26, Stewart v. United States,

214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954), reproduced in part, in J. HALL & S. GLUECK, CASES
ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 298 (2d ed. 1958).
"' "Even under the right-wrong test, no evidence should be excluded which
reasonably tends to show the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the
offense." State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 354, 361 (1958). See also
State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458, 463 (1966).
"=N.Y. PEN. LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1967). See also United States v. Currens,
290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).

"- See F. ALEXANDER, FUNDAMFENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1st ed. 1948); AmERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (Arieti ed. 1959); 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY (1957); 0.
ENGLISH & G. PEARSON, COMMON NEUROSKS
OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS (1937); A. NoyES & L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (5th ed., 1959); L. SALZMAN & J. MASSERMAN, MODERN CONCEPTS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS (1962).
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the sole determinant of conduct. Although man is an integrated
unit, psychiatrists hold that his mental processes conveniently can
be classed into three categories, according to the ways in which they
manifest themselves. The classifications are (1) cognitive (intellectual), (2) volitional (ability to control one's actions), and (3) affective (emotional) . 12 7 A broad interpretation of M'Naughton, substituting "appreciate" for "know," can take into account the first and third
classes, cognitive-affective; but it cannot take account of the problems presented by the second class, the problems of volitional control.
Thus, the real criticism of M'Naughton is that it ignores a fundamental category of psychic life. It emphasizes knowledge while ignoring self-control.' 2 ' Although a man may appreciate what he is doing
and may realize it is wrong, he may be unable to refrain from doing
it. 2 9 Perhaps the most widely known examples of this type of behavior are kleptomania and pyromania."'
Eighteen American states,'
the federal jurisdictions,'132 thirteen
33
European
and ten Latin-American countries13 1 provide that lack
""ee
M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 410 (1952);
Overholser, The Role of Psychiatry in the Administration of Criminal Justice,
93 J.A.M.A. 830 (1929).
" With the passage of years, their application [M'Naughton rules] has become
increasingly difficult in the light of modern knowledge and understanding,
and because of the variety of forms of mental alienation, sometimes transient,
which can occur as negativing volition. The law in making it essential to
a finding of insanity that the mental condition of the accused should be such as
not to understand the nature and quality of the act, or not to know that it was
wrong, has imposed positive tests which are difficult to apply where the mind
of the doer of the act did not function in control of the action ... we cannot
escape the difficulty that the M'Naughton Rules were never intended to apply
to a case where the act was done without volition or consciousness of doing it.
Regina v. Cottle, [1958] N.Z.L.R. 999, 1009 (Ct. App.).
"Keedy reports that a group of psychiatrists were asked: "Are there cases
where a person, suffering from mental derangement, knows that it is wrong to
inflict bodily harm (killing, maiming, ravishing) upon another person, but owing
to the mental derangement is incapable of controlling (resisting) the impulse to
commit such bodily harm?" Of the 102 psychiatrists who replied, 93 answered
"yes." Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 956, 989 (1952).
'" Of course, there are many others, e.g., epilepsy and manic-depressive psychoses.
A paranoid may kill in the hope of freeing himself from his anxieties, and the
compulsion neuroses lead their sufferers to do uncontrollable acts that they know are
wrong. See Spirer, The Psychology of Irresistible Impulse, 33 J. CRI-M. L.C. & P.S.
457 (1943); SULLIVAN, CRIMIE ANTDINSANITY 98, 110, 113-14 (1924). Psychiatrists
recognize that persons suffering from certain diseases cannot control their actions.
E.g., A. NoYEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 88 (3d ed. 1948); Karpman, Criminality, Insanity and the Law, 39 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 584 (1949); and 1949-1953

ROYAL COMI'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT
131GOLDSTEIN at 67, 241-42, n.1.

109-112 (1953).

132
Id.
Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U.
'Keedy,
L. REv. 956, 969-73 (1952).
13, Id. at 974-76.

PA.
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of volition under certain conditions precludes criminal responsibility.
"Assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his
act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease
of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or has lost the power of
his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the
act," then, New Mexico's Supreme Court has declared, "he can not
be found guilty." 33
Text writers have misnamed this test of insanity the "irresistible
impulse" test. It is really a control test. Professor Goldstein demonstrates in reviewing alternative statutory expressions that there are
so many differing formulations of the test "that there is no monolith
called the 'irresistible impulse' test.' ' 36 The central idea is loss of
control. Of course there are formulations that use the words "irresistible impulse;" on the other hand, there are better formulations, like
New Mexico's, resting directly on the notion of control.1 37
Weighty objections cut against a narrowly formulated control test
that uses the word "impulse" and connotes the idea of sudden and
irresistible loss of control. Like an intellectualistic interpretation of
M'Naugkton's knowledge requirement, a "sudden impulse" interpretation of the control test can be used to restrict evidence and jury
deliberations solely to its terms,3 8 thereby keeping from the jury
psychiatric testimony depicting the true nature of an accused's mental
condition, as well as the insights of modern psychology.' 39 The "impulse" connotation also fails to account for other cases where loss of
volition takes place, but not suddenly. 4 ' To apply a control test only
State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727, 731 (1954).
GOLDSTEi at 69.
"Compare
the New Mexico formulation with Alabama's formula "[I]f... the
alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and
effect, as to have been the product of it solely," Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So.
854, 866-67 (1887), or with that of Massachusetts which uses the word "impulse,"
implying a suddenness of action. Commonwealth v. Robers, 48 Mass. 500, 502-03

(1844).

" In Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Va. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d
683 (4th Cir. 1961), the jury was told that if defendant had planned his act, he
could not come within the irresistible impulse test, and to come within it, defendant's act had to be of the type that "comes upon a person rather hurriedly; it
rises quickly; short of interference by a third party, it is irresistible." In De
Jarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881), discussed in Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952), the court rested heavily on the
notion of suddenness requiring that defendant's mental disease "break out in a sudden paroxysm of violence."
GOLDSTEIN at 70-75 and J. HALL, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
761, 777-78 (1956) claim that the presentation of evidence, in fact, is not greatly
restricted, but the possibility still remains under the narrowly worded tests.

"'E.g., People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d 581 (1936).
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to crimes which have been suddenly and impulsively committed, after
a sharp internal conflict, neglects:"
many cases, such as those of melancholia . . .the sufferer from this
disease experiences a change of mood which alters the whole of its
existence. He may believe, for instance, that a future of such degradation and misery awaits both him and his faniilh that death for all is a
less dreadful alternative. Even the thought that the acts he contem-

plates are nurder and suicide pales into insignificance in contrast with
what he otherwise expects. The criminal act, in such circumstances,
may be the reverse of impulsive. It may be cooly and carefully prepared: yet it is still the act of a nmadman. This is merely an illustration;
similar states of mind are likely to lie behind the criminal act when
murders are committed by persons suffering from schizophrenia or
paranoid psychoses due to disease of the brain.
State v. Reidell

'

is a well known instance of melancholia; there,

defendant tried but failed to take his life after having killed his
family, believing that all would be better off dead. 4 '
If one asks whether a control test should be part of the insanity
defense, reason dictates an affirmative answer. Considered against
the criterion of blameworthiness, surely, the answer is clear. No
person can be considered a legitimate object of criminal or moral
blame for his acts, if he lacks the ability to control himself. We do
not hold that a man is rightfully blamed for his acts when he has
no power over them. In such a situation, lacking volition, his "acts"
are akin to a muscular spasm. We hold him blameless.
Considered against the social policy of general deterrence, which is
believed to underlie our criminal law, the answer is equally clear.

The notion of general deterrence suggests that one purpose of criminal
law is to express formal condemnation of certain acts by calling them
crimes, forbidding them, and sanctioning them in order to prevent
others from performing the described criminal acts.' 44 The theory
is that a man, knowing that his proposed act constitutes a crime and
knowing that if he engages in it he will be the subject of penal sanctions, is deterred from committing the act by his knowledge because
. 1949-1953

ROYAL Cowmm'N
CAPITAL PUNISHMIENT, REPORT 110 (1953).
(
Houst. 470, 14 A. 550 (Del. 1888).
'A most moving case is People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d 581 (1936).
."See generally voN 1IIENTIG, PUNISHMENT: ITS ORIGIN, PURPOSE AND PSYCHOLOGY (1937); Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966); Andenacs, General Prevention-Ilusion or Reality?
43 J. CRI.. L.C. & P.S. 176 (1952); Redmount, Some Basic Considerations Re1"'9

garding Penal Policy, 49 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 426 (1959).
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he fears punishment.' 4 5 But there are certain people who are nondeterrable. The general deterrence theory recognizes that it is futile
to condemn or threaten persons who are beyond the range of influence
of threatened criminal sanction.
Considered against the criterion of blameworthiness or the social
policy of general deterrences, it seems clear that any person who
fails to possess ability sufficient to control his actions should be beyond
the range of any threat or condemnation that the criminal law can
make. Impaired volition should qualify a defendant for the insanity
defense. In states that do not allow impaired volition to qualify under
the insanity defense nonvolitional mentally-ill offenders are criminally
convicted and punished, instead of treated. Such a situation is abhorrent in view of the professed justifications for the criminal law.
In 1947, the Washington Supreme Court construed different statutes as presenting a unitary irresistible impulse test, and rejected the
test. It said "that this court has never recognized or approved the
defense of irresistible impulse, nor do we now feel that we should
accept the doctrine of irresistible impulse as a defense in a criminal
action."' 40 Fifteen years later, when it was asked to reconsider its
position, the Washington court refused; 47 today Washington's insanity defense does not allow for impaired volition of a mentally-ill
accused.
In its last refusal to adopt a control test, the Washington court
based its position on three 148 considerations. First, "the classic criti"',"The end of all penal laws is that they may not be applied." J.FICHTE,

THE

345 (1889).
..State v. Maish, 29 Wn. 2d 52, 59, 185 P.2d 486, 490 (1947), criticized by
Hoedemaker, Irresistible Inpulse as a Defense in Criminal Law, 23 WASH. L. REv.
1 (1948).
'State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 590-92, 374 P.2d 942, 965-66 (1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 883, noted in 38 WASH. L. REv. 305 (1963).
"'I
do not deal with the court's obviously strained argument That in 1909, when
Washington's legislature passed a statute abolishing the insanity defense, which
statute later was held unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court, State v.
Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910), that the unconstitutional statute,
today, expresses an "established policy in this state ... to strictly limit the application of that [insanity] defense." State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d at 590, 374 P.2d at 965.
Little can be added to the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Hunter, id. at 597-98, 374
P.2d at 970:
We have never before stated nor intimated that the 'right and wrong' test is a
constitutional minimum, and I see no reason to conclude that our legislature
has evidenced a desire that this state retain the 'right and wrong' test. The
statutes concerning the defense of mental irresponsibility, under which we now
operate, were passed in 1907. The legislature did not then inform this Court,
nor has it since informed this Court, as to how we should define or view the
concept of mens rea in implementing the defense of mental irresponsibility.
The Strassburg case, supra, confirmed that mens rea cannot be eliminated as an
element of crime. The delineation of that concept is a judicial function.
And, of course, so is the delineation of the test of insanity.
SCIENCE OF RIGHTS
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cism of 'irresistible impulse'-which applies also to any test which

includes volition-is that such a test is extremely hard to apply with
any hope of reasonable accuracy."' 49 One wonders whether this objection is justifiable. For example, the Washington court expects
juries to apply a formula requiring that an accused, to qualify for
the insanity defense, be "unable to perceive the moral qualities of the
act with which he is charged.""' There are, of course, many other
abstract formulas in Washington criminal law, e.g., the reasonable
man doctrine, and they are not "too hard" for juries to apply. The
issue of "control" is of no greater difficulty for a jury than those of
"intent," or "knowledge," or "negligence."
Secondly, the control test was rejected because "with regard to
capacity to control one's behavior, it would appear that there is no
more psychiatric certainty today than there was when this court
decided State v. Maish, supra.""' Thus, the court cast its vote
against psychiatry's credentials. Whether the Washington Supreme
Court is competent to assess the modern scientific validity of psychiatry, I shall not discuss. 15 2 However, if psychiatrists tend not to satisfy
the court's criteria of certainty (which remain unidentified and unexplained) and if a control test is believed too hard for juries to
apply, Washington's Supreme Court has contributed to this state of
affairs. The court has created confusing trial conditions that make
application of a formula difficult, dilute psychiatric testimony, and
afford little guidance. For example, in State v. Brooks". the court
established that in this state, nonexpert witnesses are fully qualified
to give their opinions on the sanity or insanity of an accused, after
I Id. at 591, 374 P. 2d at 966.
" ld. at 579, 374 P. 2d at 959. See text discussion at notes 95-103 supra.
..State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d at 592, 374 P. 2d at 966. This notion is not derived
from State v. Maish, 29 Wn. 2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947), but rather from a much
earlier case, State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909), where, at 71, it is stated
that "when a jury of laymen are invited to go further than to answer the question,
had the accused sufficient capacity at the time of committing the act to distinguish
between right and wrong with reference to it, they are invited to enter the realm of
speculation where even the opinion of the alienist is met by like opinion, and he
can find no guide to clear his doubt or direct him toward a truthful verdict."
Evidently, the Washington Supreme Court believes either that psychiatry has not
progressed since 1909, which is false, or that it has not progressed sufficiently. If
the latter is true, however, the court fails to tell us how much would be "sufficient"
and under what criteria we might recognize it.
12 But, generally, consider the views of WEIHOFEN,, at 85, and S. GLUECK,
LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 54, 57-58 (1962).
: 4 Wash. 328, 30 P. 147 (1892) ; accord, State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 504, 291
P. 1093 (1930); State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909). The court has
extended this rule to civil cases; see Halbach v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 152 Wash.
492, 278 P. 178 (1929).
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they have testified to the behavior of a defendant upon which they
base their opinions. It is true that a trial court judge may exclude
nonexpert witness opinions on an accused's insanity when he is convinced that the witness lacked sufficient personal knowledge to constitute a foundation for an opinion.154 But by then the nonexpert witness has made his utterances before a jury. More objectionably, this
rule opens the door to any and all kinds of testimony about an accused. Because nonexpert witness testimony is competent to show
insanity,' fairness requires that a prosecutor be allowed to use the
same type of evidence to prove sanity.'
It can produce unclarity
and confusion before a jury; psychiatric testimony can become
entangled with lay testimony, and the ensuing confusion can make
57
application of any rule of insanity difficult.
Finally, it appears that the Washington Supreme Court rejected a
control test because it favors "a minimized insanity defense."':5
Evidently the Washington court believes that there are multitudes of
potential defendants patiently waiting for it to approve a control
test, who will then rush in when the barriers have been lowered. 50
This is, of course, false. Due to the stigma attached and the possibility
of an indeterminate commitment if successful, few defendants assert
the defense. This last point-indeterminate commitment-means that
an acquittal by reason of insanity really is not an acquittal, in the
usual sense of the term, because an accused does not go free, but to
the criminally insane ward of the state penitentiary from which it is
" State v. Wilkins, 156 Wash. 456, 287 P. 23 (1930); accord, State v. Miller,
177 Wash. 442, 43 P.2d 535 (1934). For interesting views on lay testimony, see
Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Pederson, The Opilion
Evidence Ride in Oregon,33 OpE. L. REv. 243 (1954).
" In State v. Flanney, 61 Wash. 482, 112 P. 630 (1911), it was held reversible error
not to allow defendant to show that his wife was a member of a "Shaker Society"
that taught and practiced illicit intercourse, causing defendant (husband) to suspect
her of lewd conduct, thereby losing his "reason" when he shot her.
" "Where the defense is insanity, general or partial, the door is thrown wide
open for the admission of evidence; every act of the party's life is relevant to the
issue and admissible in evidence." State v. Odell, 38 Wn. 2d 4, 21, 227 P.2d 710,
719 (1951); accord, State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957); State v.
Miller, 177 Wash. 442, 32 P.2d 535 (1934).
'-'For discussion, see State v. Williams, 34 Wn. 2d 367, 209 P.2d 331 (1949).
" State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 590-91, 374 P.2d 942, 965-66 (1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 883 (1963).
" For example, in a recent murder case, Don White was sentenced to death.
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the
United States Supreme Court declined to review it. At the age of twenty-two, Don
White beat an old woman to death in a laundry room. He raped her, took her
ring and watch (which were of little value), then spent more than an hour in the
room, folding laundry, placing some of it under the head of the dying woman, and
chatting with the unsuspecting people who came into the laundry. Later that day
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difficult to obtain release."" In reaching its conclusion favoring a
"minimized insanity defense" the court approvingly quoted an article
by Professor Wechsler. 61 as setting forth the policy rationale behind
"a minimized insanity defense." But, conveniently, the court ignored
the fact that Professor Wechsler inveighed against Durham's rule, 6 not a control test; that Professor Wechsler explicitly wrote that
M'Naughton and a control test would come within a "minimized insanity defense;""' and that Professor Wechsler was the chief reporter
for, and author of, the ALI's Model Penal Code which includes a control test in its insanity defense... and which had been argued to Washhe killed a longshoreman, whom, like the old woman, he had never seen before.
He stabbed him with a knife, then wandered a little distance away to drink wine
and watch the police come and go. At trial, expert witnesses on both sides testified
to the accused's serious mental disorder. Consider his background. He had never
lived with his mother, who was only thirteen at his birth. When he was four
months old, a red cap at a railway depot hailed the woman who became his adoptive
mother to ask if she wanted a baby. Despite his superior intelligence-his IQ was
about 130-he was expelled from every school he attended. Nine times he was in
state institutions, with a growing record of violence and delinquency. In 1951, a
child psychiatrist said he was suffering from "a very malignant mental illness,"
that "institutionalization is absolutely necessary," and that "he will almost certainly
wind up in prison or in a state mental hospital." It is apparent that, whatever the
cause, the defendant was terribly sick, that his sickness was of long duration, and
that it had been brought to the attention of the authorities time and time again.
Yet, Don White could not qualify under Washington's "minimized insanity defense." State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
883 (1963). Commenting on Washington's insanity test, Judge Bazelon said "that
a test of responsibility which allows Don White to be sentenced to death is no test
at all." Bazelon, The Concept Of Responsibility, 53 GEO. L. J. 5, 13 (1964).
16Instructive is State v. Tugas, 37 Wn. 2d 236, 222 P.2d 817 (1950). The jury
found defendant not guilty because of insanity at the time of the act and that,
although his insanity did not continue, defendant was not safe to be at large because
his insanity was likely to recur. Appellant was then "committed" to "the ward for
the criminally insane at the state penitentiary." Id. at 240, 222 P.2d at 819. In
this situation, defendant is not entitled to be released by the statutory procedure of
jury trial (WASI. REV. CODE § 10.76.070 (1957)), to determine whether he is safe to
be freed because his insanity is no longer liable to recur, but defendant's only remedy
is habeas corpus, with all its limitations. State v. Tugas, 39 Wn. 2d 241, 234 P.2d
1082 (1951), noted in 27 WASH. L. REV. 156 (1956). See also State ex rel.
Thompson v. Snell, 46 Wash. 327, 89 P. 931 (1907); Comment, Hospitalization Of
Mentally Ill Criminals In Pennsylvania And New Jersey, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 78
(1961).
'11
Wechsler, The Criteria Of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. ClI. L. REv. 367
(1967).
'-'Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Under Durham
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect."
10 Professor Wechsler wrote: "On this analysis, the category of the irresponsible must be defined in extreme terms....
The category must be so extreme that to
the ordinary man, burdened by passion and beset by large temptations, the exculpation of the irresponsibles bespeaks no weakness in the law....
This will be found
to be the case in every instance where M'Naughton operates; with tight administration that distinguishes with care between the irresistible and unresisted impulse,
it is the case under this test as well, though doubts about the possibility of such
administration surely have their point." Wechsler, The Criteria Of Criminal
Responsibility, 22 U. CHi. L. REV. 367, 374 (1955). (Emphasis supplied).
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
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ington's court but rejected. The court's narrow "minimized insanity
defense"' 65 is not Professor Wechsler's.
It is true that a control test, available to an accused who appears
normal before a jury and who obviously is not out of contact with
reality, is more easily feigned than a test that is applicable only to an
accused who is obviously deranged. But this consideration alone is
not persuasive, particularly in Washington. First, any defendant who
looks normal and acts in usually expected ways will have to overcome
a jury's prejudice; a jury naturally will be unwilling to believe that
a "normal" defendant had no self-control at the time of the act.
Secondly, unless there is evidence of a long history of an accused's
uncontrolled behavior, plus expert testimony explaining the origin
and consequences of a disease that accounts for the accused's uncontrolled behavior, the defense will probably fail. Thirdly, in Washington the insanity defense is an affirmative defense, and the burden of
proving insanity at the time of the act rests squarely on the defendant
and never shifts. 16 An early landmark case, State v. Clark,6 7 established that an accused must plead the insanity defense and prove it
by a preponderance of the evidence; it is not enough for the jury to
have a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.'
Thus, in Washington at
least, the possibility that defendants will succeed by feigning loss of
control is slim indeed. The argument that they will do so sucessfully
is not a persuasive reason for failing to adopt a control test as part
of Washington's insanity defense.
As has been discussed above, the Washington Supreme Court may
erroneously read M'Naughton in the conjunctive and may retain
M'Naughton's right-wrong portion while deleting "the nature and
quality" branch from its own insanity defense.' 69 Ambiguously,
the court interprets "wrong" to mean "morally wrong,"' o ° rather than
" "Finally M'Naughton is preferable to the American Law Institute's test in

that the M'Naughton rule better serves the basic purpose of the criminal law-to

minimize crime in society." State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 592, 374 P.2d 942,
966 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
"This
has been true since the first case in territorial days, see McAllister v.
Territory of Washington, 1 Wash. Terr. 360 (1872), and has not changed to this
day, State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957).
"' 34 Wash. 485, 76 P. 98 (1904). In 19 states, the federal courts and the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the ultimate burden of proof is upon the
state, not the defendant. See WEIHOFEN at 226-28.
"This was an important consideration in Wisconsin's adoption of the Model
Penal Code test, State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
" See text, supraat notes 90-92.
7 See text, supra at notes 94-95.
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contrary to the criminal law.' 7' Finally, and unjustifiably, the court
refuses to allow a control test as part of its insanity defense.1 7 2 The
time has come for Washington's Supreme Court, or its Legislature, to
look anew at Washington's insanity defense and to develop a new and
better one.ll
See text, supra at notes 96-101.
'-'-See text, supra at notes 131-165; for additional confusing opinions on Washington's insanity test, see, State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909), where the
court rejected New Hampshire's rule and the misnamed "irresistible impulse"
test. It inconsistently held that ... insanity being a question of fact, whenever it
apl)eared from all the evidence bearing on the question that a person charged with
crime did not have the mental power to choose between right and wrong with
reference to the particular act charged, he was of unsound mind, and if such affection
was the efficient cause of the act and if he would not have committed the act but for
that affection, he should be acquitted; for one with such mind is non compos inentis
and entitled to the protection of the law." In State v. Schafer, 156 Wash. 240, 286 P.
833 (1930), the court confused the right-wrong test ("while it seems to be fairly well
established ... that appellant was subnormal and was of the mental age of nine years,
his ability to distinguish between right and wrong is the test of sanity or insanity in
criminal law." Id. at 252) with a control test ("nevertheless it [the term 'mental irresponsibility'] implies nothing but what is defined in law as criminal insanity: that is,
whether there was mental capacity and moral freedom to do or abstain from doing the
particular act.") ; in State v. Henke, 196 Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938), the court
reaffirmed the above quote from State i'. Craig. In State v. Maish, 29 Wn. 2d 52, 185
P.2d 486 (1947), the Schafer language of a control test was argued to the court, but
was rejected. See criticism in Hoedemaker, Irresistible Impulse As A Defense In
Criminal Law, 23 WAsh. L. REv. 1 (1948). In State v. Rio, 38 Wn. 2d 446, 230 P.2d
308 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867, the court held that a toxic psychosis, produced
by excessive self-induced use of alcohol, that (lid not result in a permanent insanity,
permanently disabling the accused from distinguishing between right and wrong, could
not qualify under Washington's insanity test. This is, of course, contrary to the court's
previous position that insanity need exist only at the time of the act, not permanently.
'"Seattle
v. Hill, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 778, 435 P.2d 692 (1968). Addressing itself to Washington's insanity defense, the court said, "this state is committed to
the rule that every sane person is responsible for his voluntary acts. State v. Mays,
65 Wn. 2d 58, 395 P.2d 758 (1964). If one is capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong and knows the nature and moral qualities of his actions, he is
deemed sane under the M'Naughten [sic] rule, a doctrine adhered to by this and the
great majority of courts. State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962),
cert. denied.... 375 U.S. 833...." Id. at 789, 435 P.2d at 700. From the first sentence
in this quotation one reasonably could conclude that were a person found "sane" he
would not be responsible for his involuntary acts, thereby believing that Washington followed some type of control test. See generally, C. MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 20-56 (1926). But, State v. Mays, supra, rejected a proferred control
test, reaffirming State v. White, supra, that also rejected the ALI's control test.
And, in reality, Washington does not exculpate a person for loss of control, as
demonstrated by the holding in Seattle v. Hill, supra, which determined that a
confirmed alcoholic who had been convicted of drunkenness 98 times, sentenced to
17% years in jail, and was found to be "a chronic addictive alcoholic," was a proper
subject for criminal punishment, and not excusable for lack of volitional controls.
The second sentence in the above quotation demonstrates even more clearly the
Washington Supreme Court's confusion on the meaning of M'Naoghton. Evidently
the court believes the M'Naughton test involves a conjunctive, not disjunctive,
expression: Is a person "capable of distinguishing between right and wrong and
knows the nature and moral qualities of his actions?" I confess I do not know what
the court's intended meaning is, especially when one recalls that the Washington
court has interpreted the first part of the above conjunction in the "morally wrong"
sense. At best, one could say that the court really did not intend a conjunction.
and wrote a redundant, single sentence. Even so, there remains the problem of
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THE INSANITY TEST REFORIMULATED

It is probably true that "the exact wording of the [insanity defense]
'
and the actual name of the test are comparatively unimportant,"174
but the crucially important consideration for any new insanity defense
is that it contain three "necessary elements," namely, references to
a defendant's cognition, his emotion, and his capacity to control his
behavior. I offer a test modeled after that of the Model Penal
7
Code,175 M'Naughton, and Currens:"'
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of a mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either (a) to appreciate the factual nature, context and consquaring the meaning of the redundancy with that of the first sentence dealing with
loss of control.

17'Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 998 (1962). For similar views, see Carter v. United States, 325 F.2d 697,
707 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United States v. Cain, 298
F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1962).
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962). The Code definition
has been adopted or approved, in whole or in part, in several jurisdictions by
judicial decision. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325
F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); Frigillana v.
United States, 307 F.2d 665, 670 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (favorable comment); Feguer
v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 244-45 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962);
Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
998 (1962); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 1961) (cognitive
elements (M'Naughton) omitted); Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 864-65,
(Ky. 1963); Commonwealth v. McHoul, Mfass.2d-, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967);
State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 NAV.2d 458 (1966) (by this decision the
defendant in Wisconsin is given a choice between the M'Naughton and Model
Penal Code tests but, if he chooses the Code test, he must assume the burden of
proof). Elsewhere the Code definition has been adopted by statute (with modifications in three instances): ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §6-2 (1961); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 59, § 9(a) (1967 Supp.) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.030 (omits "substantial
capacity" qualification); N.Y. PEN. LAW §30.05 (McKinney Supp. 1967) ("lacks
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: (a) The nature and consequence
of such conduct; or (b) That such conduct was wrong"); ch. 196, §95-501 [1967]
Laws of Montana 6; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1959) (substitutes "adequate capacity" for "substantial capacity"). The Code definition has been proposed for adoption
or is under consideration in a number of jurisdictions. It has been judicially rejected in three. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50, 68-69 (1959); State v.
Poulson, 14 Utah 2d 213, 381 P.2d 93, 94-95, cert. denied, Poulson v. Utah, 375 U.S.
898 (1963); State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 578-593, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
*In United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (1961), Judge Biggs refused to
adopt the Model Penal Code's test on the grounds that it placed too much emphasis
on cognition, and that jurors might so interpret it. Judge Biggs deleted references
to cognition, and fashioned a new test: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time
of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or
defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law which lie is alleged to have violated." Id. at 774. See Diamond, From
M'Naughton To Currens, and Beyond, 50 CAL. L. REv. 189 (1962). But by deleting
co'"nition Judge Biggs "seems to have denied to jurors a ground for finding insanity
when the capacity for self-control is intact but the defendant did not 'appreciate
the criminality of his conduct.'" GOLDSTEIN at 88.
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sequences of his act, or (b) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct; or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he
is alleged to have violated.1 77

I believe this insanity defense will provide the three necessary
elements. In so doing it will allow for full and complete development
of medical testimony. A psychiatrist could testify in detail to the
origin, development and nature of an accused's disease; to the medical
basis for his diagnosis; and to the probable consequences of the mental
disease on the conduct of the accused. It will allow the law to take
advantage of subsequent changes in medical science: the test will
not be frozen in a particular period of medical history. The proposed
test leaves the ultimate issue to the jury, where it belongs, but, unlike
Durham, 7 ' it provides the jury with guidance. It will enable a judge
"'This leaves the "mental disease" notion undefined; but here I follow Professor Goldstein: "it is now apparent that a precise definition of insanity is impossible, that the effort to eliminate functional definitions deprives the jury of an
essential concreteness of statement and that it is entirely sensible to leave 'mental
disease' undefined, at least so long as it is modified by a statement of minimal conditions for being held to account under a system of criminal law." GOLDSTEIN- at
87. The basic reasons are that there is no disease, qua disease, that automatically
exculpates its sufferers from criminal responsibility (see Carter v. United States
252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957)): thus the concept of criminal insanity does not
function to raise medical questions, but, rather, it raises questions of social policy,
functioning to state the criteria under which official criminal condemnation shall
not take place, identifying why that condemnation shall not take place, rather
than upon whom. See Fingarette, The Concept of Mental Disease In Criminal
Law Insanity Tests, 33 U. CHL L. REV. 229 (1966). Interestingly, there is no
agreed medical definition of the concept "mental disease." See Alexander, Fundamental
Concepts. Basic Principles and Assumptions of the Psychodynamic Position on
Mental Disease, in INTEGRATING APPROACHES TO MENTAL DISEASE 138 (Kruse ed.
1957); A-m. PSYCHIATRIC ASS',, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 47 (2d ed. 1964); Com-

MITTEE ON AOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N-, DIAGMENTAL DISORDERS 10 (1952); M. FROHLICH,
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL:
CLASSIFICATION OF 'MENTAL DISORDERS, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL HEALTH

1032 (1963): Hakeem, A Critique Of The Psychiatric Approach To Crime And
Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 650 (1958); Scott, Research Definitions
of Mental Health And Mental Illness, 55 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 29 (1958).
I do not discuss Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), or its rule:
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect." Id. at 874-75. It really does not establish a rule of
criminal responsibility, and fails to point the jury to any criteria relevant to the
purposes of the criminal law. For commentary see Blocker v. United States. 274
F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957):
United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954); SymposiumInsanity And The Criminal Law. 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1955) ; Maine, see State v.
Hathaway, 161 Me. 255, 211 A.2d 558 (1965); Vermont, see VT. STAT. AN',. tit. 13
§ 4801 (1959); and the Virgin Islands, see V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 14 (1957) have
adopted the Durham rule, but 28 states have rejected it, see, Blocker v. United States,
288 F.2d 853, 866 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1961). For accounts of developments and practices
under the Durham rule see Arens, 77e Durham Rule In Action. 1 LAW & Soc. REV.
41 (1967) ; Clayton, Six 1ears After Durham, 44 J. At. JUD. Soc'y 18 (1960) ; Krash,
The Durham Rule And Judicial Administration Of The Insanity Defense In The District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905 (1961).
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to instruct a jury in language that they can understand. The proposed rule exculpates only those who are both non-deterrable and
unfit subjects for blame; 179 thus, the proposed test will serve the
interests of justice, and the underlying purposes of the criminal law
by identifying those who come within the test as persons in need of
care and rehabilitation and those who come without it as fit subjects
for punishment. Thus, the twin purposes of deterrence and retribution are served. Finally, because the proposed rule can be used and
understood by jurors and because it continuingly will afford the
medical profession full testimonial opportunities, the proposed insanity
defense can serve as a bridge for the law between the facts of medical
science and the purposes of the criminal law.
In most states, if an insanity defense is successful, the trial court
(judge or jury) determines whether the mentally-ill defendant ultimately will be committed to a mental hospital, but in 12 states the
defendant is mandatorily committed."' Washington follows the former practice and requires that if a jury should find an accused insane
at the time of the act, by special verdict it must determine whether the
accused's insanity still exists or whether it is so liable to recur that
the accused is unsafe to be freed. 181 If the jury finds that an accused's
insanity persists or that he is unsafe to be returned to society, then
"the court shall enter judgment in accordance therewith, and shall
order the defendant committed as a criminally insane person..."; 182
if the jury's findings are otherwise and the accused is safe to be at
83
large, then he is released.1
It is important that jurors be instructed ori the consequences of
their finding of an acquittal by reason of insanity, but in only one
jurisdiction, the District of Columbia. is such an instruction mandatory on the trial judge. 84 The jurors discuss this issue during delibSBut compare, Silber, Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and
Voluntary Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 63-67, 68-89 (1967).
'A

(1962)

summary of the statutes is in Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 724
(concurring opinion); see also Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Pris-

oter Acquitted By Reason of Insanity. 38 TEx. L. REv. 849 (1960).

Comment,

Compulsory Connuitnent Following Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L.

REv.

409 (1961); The Model Penal Code opts for mandatory commitment, MODEL PEZNAL

CODE, § 4.08, Comment (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
' WAsH. REv. CODE § 10.76.030 (1957).
" WAsH. REv. CODE § 10.76.040 (1957).
Usually, he is confined in the maximum
security section of a mental hospital; thus, it is very much like being in prison, see
S. Rubin, LAw OF CRIMIITAL CORREcTiOx 277-80, 517-19 (1963).
1s3 Id.

S'Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961
(1957).
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erations, and if they are not given accurate information on it by the
trial judge, then they rely on information (probably less reliable.)
that has been supplied by other jurors.': Some state supreme courts
recommend that such an instruction be given by the trial judge," s';
7
and others suggest it.11
In Washington, the jury must find a special verdict on the current
mental state of the defendant, but the jurors are not told what the
consequences of their findings will be. No Washington case has been
found expressly denying a Washington trial court the power to instruct
on the issue. To the contrary, three justices'
of Washington's
Supreme Court have urged that:
Specifically, the defendant who pleads mental irresponsibility as a defense
should be entitled to have the jury informed of the following: (1) Upon
jury findings that he is not guilty by reason of mental irresponsibility and
that such mental condition still exists or that because of the likelihood of
relapse or recurrence he is tnsafe to be at large, the court will order
the defendant committed as a criminally insane person. (2) A person
so committed shall not be discharged save upon the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction made after a trial and judgment of discharge.
(3) An order of discharge inav be entered only after a trial before a
jury in the court of the county that committed him, wherein it is found
that he is a safe person to be at large.
This seems to be the better reasoned view, and it should become the
established practice. It is recommended.

" I am of the opinion that, upon proper request, a defendant who pleads mental
irresponsibility is entitled to have the jury informed, by way of instruction, as
to the procedures in the State of Washington for the handling of those who are
acquitted, but found by the jury unsafe to be at large in society. As the record
in this case indicates, juries are acutely sensitive to the prospect of having
dangerous persons at large and are tempted to "take the law into their own
hands" in order to carry out what they may consider is their responsibility to
protect society. In order to make the defense of mental irresponsibility a
meaningful one, it is necessary to that end that juries be made aware of the
social controls and machinery which the law provides for society's protection
from a mentally irresponsible person who is unsafe to be at large.
State v. Vhite, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 602, 374 P.2d 942. 972 (1962) (dissent).
' E.g.. State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2(1 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
"' E.q.. McClure v. State, 104 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
'Justices
Hunter, Finley and Foster in State v. White, 60 Wn. 2d 551, 602.
374 P.2d 942, 972 (1962), relying on WAVsu. REv. CODE §§ 10.76.040, .060, .070
(1957). But compare State v. Tugas. 39 Wn. 2d 241, 234 P.2d 1082 (1951), and
Note. 27 WASH. L. REV. 156 (1952). The objection to such an instruction is that it
might serve to take a jury's attention off the insanity defense, and might produce
compromise verdicts. Sec Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962).

